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THE NONTARIFF TRADE BARRIER CHALLENGE:




Since the time of Ricardo' it has been recognized that the world's
real income can be maximized only if free trade exists among nations.
The principle of free trade places all nations in the most efficient pro-
duction configuration, wherein each produces only those goods and
services in which it has an efficiency advantage and trades for all other
goods and services it desires.- While political, social, and economic
* Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College of Law; B.A. Uni-
versity of Tulsa; J.D. University of Tulsa College of Law; LL.M. Columbia University.
1. David Ricardo (1772-1823) -British economist who developed the Doctrine of
Comparative Advantage to demonstrate the benefits which can be achieved through free
trade in order to secure repeal of the British Corn Laws. For a brief overview of Ricar-
do's life and economic theory see R. HEILBRONER, THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERs, 73-
101 (4th ed. 1972).
2. The free trade principle is based on the fact that theie exists among nations
a diversity of production conditions. This diversity of production conditions results
from each nation possessing a unique blend of natural resources, capital goods, kinds
of labor, and technical knowledge. If each nation makes optimal use of its productive
factors, it is inevitable that each nation can produce certain goods and services more
efficiently than other nations. Moreover, within each nation some goods and services
can be produced more efficiently than others. For example, labor "rich" nations are
more efficient than labor "poor" nations in producing such labor-intensive goods as tex-
tiles and shoes. Therefore, the world's level of real income is maximized to the extent
1
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factors have prevented a universal free trade system from existing, the
postwar era has brought significant progress toward liberalizing world
trade. In Geneva a drama is unfolding, the outcome of which may de-
termine the shape of international trade, economic and political pat-
terns for the rest of this century. This drama will determine whether
postwar progress toward liberalized trade will be continued, stymied or
reversed.
The title of the Geneva drama is the Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions, the seventh round of trade negotiations held since 1947, when
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was sub-
scribed by the Contracting Parties.3  These current negotiations are the
most important to be conducted by the Contracting Parties, because
they are a continuation of the aborted Tokyo Round of 1973, which
that each nation trades for goods which can be more efficiently produced abroad. This
prescription for maximizing world income is known as Ricardo's Doctrine of Compara-
tive Advantage.
An important corollary to the Doctrine of Comparative Advantage is that two na-
tions can engage profitably in trade, even when one nation has an absolute advantage
over the other in producing every item to be traded, if there is a difference between
their relative efficiencies of production. This corollary can be illustrated by a hypo-
thetical world economy consisting of two nations (A and B) and two products (food
and cloth). Nation A produces one unit of food per one unit of production cost and
one unit of cloth per two units of production cost. It costs Nation B three production
units to produce one unit of food and four production units to produce one unit of cloth.
Clearly, Nation A has an absolute efficiency advantage over Nation B with respect to
producing both products. However, an examination of each nation's domestic produc-
tion cost ratio reveals that Nation B has a relative advantage over Nation A in produc-
ing cloth. This is because it costs Nation B only 1.33 units of food to produce one
unit of cloth, as compared to Nation A's cost of two units of food per unit of cloth.
Under these circumstarces the incomes of such nations can be maximized by Nation
A producing food and importing cloth and Nation B producing cloth and importing
food. If there are no trade distortions and negligible transportation costs, through free
trade, Nation A's production cost per unit of cloth will be reduced from two units to
1.33 units of food and Nation B's production cost per unit of food will be reduced
from .75 units to .5 units of cloth. For more technical explanations of how world
income can be maximized by free trade, see R. HARROD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
9-52 (rev. ed. 1962) [hereinafter cited as HARROD ECONOMICS]; P. KENEN, INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMICS 7-30 (2d ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as KENEN ECONOMICS]; P.
SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS 645-78 (8th ed. 1970) [herein-
after cited as SAMUELSON].
3. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade is a trade treaty entered into
by twenty-three governments (including the United States) in 1947, which specifies the
multilaterally agreed upon trade principles governing the trade doctrines of all its signa-
tories. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pt. 5 at A3
(1947), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (entered into force for the United States
Jan. 1, 1948) [hereinafter cited as GATT].
4. The Tokyo Round of 1973 was to be a major offensive against nontariff trade
distortions. However, the United States was without negotiating authority, since all such
authority granted under the Tariff Expansion Act of 1962 had expired in 1967. Rather
than risk expending efforts to develop agreements concerning nontariff distortions, into
2
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marked the beginning of the GATT initiatives to "reduce or eliminate
nontariff measures, or, where this is not appropriate, to reduce or elim-
inate their trade restricting or distorting effects, and to bring such meas-
ures under more effective international discipline." 5  Prior to the
Tokyo Round, the primary emphasis of GATT negotiations had been
the achievement of multilateral tariff reductions. 6 Tariff reduction was
a logical target because tariffs are easily identifiable trade barriers, gen-
erally are associated with national trade policies, and produce measur-
able trade effects. As a result of these negotiations, in particular the
Kennedy Round (1963-67), the tariff rates of the major trading nations
have fallen to moderately low levels. 7
In contrast with a tariff, "a nontariff trade distortion is any meas-
ure or policy that causes internationally traded goods or productive fac-
tors to be allocated in such a way as to reduce potential world income."8
This definition of nontariff trade barriers (NTB's) encompasses any
government policy or measure other than tariff rates which produces ef-
fects on world trade.9 Examples of these government measures in-
clude regional development programs involving subsidies, embargoes
on exports to fight inflation, and environmental programs which impose
strict product standards. NTB's are difficult to identify, involve gov-
ernment programs for achieving social, economic and environmental
goals, and produce effects on trade which are not susceptible to accu-
rate measurement. 10  As a consequence, negotiations concerning
which the United States might not be able to join, the negotiators agreed to postpone
the negotiations until all of the principals had received negotiation mandates from their
governments. The Tokyo negotiators did succeed in establishing the Trade Negotiations
Committee which, through its working groups, prepared the guidelines and agenda for
the current multilateral trade negotiations. See NINETEENT ANN. PRES. REP. ON THE
TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 8 (1974).
5. Declaration of Ministers Approved at Tokyo on 14 September 1973, para. 3b,
as cited in S. GOLT, TnE GATT NEGOTAIONS, 1973-75: A GUmE TO THE IssuEs 30
(1974) [hereinafter cited as GOLT GUIDE].
6. See G. MEIER, PROBLEMS OF TRADE POLICY 25 (1973).
7. As a result of the GAIT resolutions, the "average most-favored-nation indus-
trial tariff levels in major industrial countries are in the moderate order of 10 percent,
probably well below half the levels prevailing at the beginning of the postwar period."
E. PREEG, ECONOMIC BLOCS AND U.S. FOREiGN POLICY 14 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
PREEG BLOCS].
8. Baldwin, Non-Tariff Distortions To International Trade, in 1 UNrrED STATES
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD 641 (Williams Com-
mission ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Baldwin Non-Tariff Distortions].
9. 1 UNrrED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMIssION, REPORT ON TRADE BAR-
BEERS 45 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1 TRADE COMMISSION REPORT].
10. After the Kennedy Round, an inventory of NTB's was compiled under GATT
auspices by having each member nation list the policies and measures of other member
nations it felt imposed restrictions on world trade. The inventory when completed con-
1976]
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NTB's raise such issues as (1) which government measures and poli-
cies should be treated as NTB's, (2) whether economic goals should
have priority over other goals, (3) which criteria should be used to de-
termine whether NTB reductions have resulted in equivalent benefits
accruing to participating nations, and (4) to what degree national sov-
ereignty must be sacrificed to supranational entities in order to achieve
further trade liberalization. 11
Furthermore, any change in the configuration of the worldwide
structure of trade barriers leads to changes in the patterns of interna-
tional trade and domestic income distributions. This requires negoti-
ators to be sensitive to the problems of less-developed countries and to
those investors, workers and communities closely connected with im-
port-displaced industries if they are to succeed in controlling the use of
NIB's. These latter problems raise the broad issue of the continuing
conflict between economic efficiency and economic justice, and the
specific issues of trade preferences for less-developed countries, market
disruption safeguard mechanisms, and domestic adjustment programs.
Although the issues confronting the negotiators at the multilateral
trade negotiations are complex, they should not be allowed to obscure
the high economic stakes involved. For example, one source estimates
that the cost of the United States' protective measures to its consumers
is as high as $15 billion annually.'2 The United States International
Trade Commission estimates that current restraints on textiles and ap-
parel cost American consumers $1 billion per year and that $37 billion
would be saved over a fifteen-year period if all United States quantita-
tive restrictions in place in 1972 were eliminated.' 8
At present, the Geneva drama is bogged down in bickering and
unanswered proposals. Furthermore, the participants face legal re-
strictions in the form of GATT trade principles and the parameters of
sisted of over 800 items. Naturally, many nations were surprised that certain of their
government policies were considered to be trade distortions. See Patterson, Current
GATT Work on Trade Barriers, in 1 UNrrED STATES INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY
IN AN INrERDEPENDENT WORLD 619, 621-22 (Williams Commission ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as Patterson GATT].
11. See generally H. MALMGRPFN, INTERNATIONAL EcONOMIc PEAcCEKEPINo IN
P-Asn 11 82-98 (1972) hereinafter ctied as MALMGREN PEACEKEEPING]; Malmgren &
Marks, Negotiating Nontariff Distortions to Trade, 7 LAw & POL. INT'L Bus. 327, 327-
29 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Malm gren & Marks Negotiating].
12. Hesburgh, Introduction to THm U.S. AN THE DEVELOPINo WoRLD: AGENDA FOR
ACTION 2, 9 (Overseas Development Council ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Hesburgh
Introduction].
13. 4 UN1TED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, REPORT ON TRADE BAR-
REmEs 14, 17 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 4 TRADE COMIMSSION REPORT].
[Vol. 12:1
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their negotiation mandates, political restrictions in the form of in-
creased domestic protectionism and the pressing demands of the less-
developed countries, and economic restrictions because of the slow
worldwide recovery from the recession. 4 It is in this context that the
following policy recommendations, designed to reduce NTB's, are of-
fered. These recommendations were developed by examining selected
trade laws of the United States, trade principles of GATT, and specific
NTB's in light of traditional arguments for protectionism and the cur-
rent economic and political environment.
CLASSIFYING NONTARIFF DISTORTIONS
NTB's reduce the world's real income level by diverting produc-
tive resources from their most efficient uses. They erect obstacles to
international trade which prevent countries from trading for those prod-
ucts which are more efficiently produced abroad, thereby forcing ineffi-
cient production at home.' 5 For simplicity, NTB's are classified in this
article into four general categories of excluders, withholders, handicap-
pers and promoters based on the type and severity of impact they have
on world trade.
Excluders
Excluders are NTB's which are used by countries to destroy or
render meaningless the comparative advantages imports have over
domestic products. Excluders operate either by limiting the supply of im-
ports the excluding country permits to enter its boundaries, or by rais-
ing the prices of imports to uncompetitive levels. When a country ap-
plies excluders to a particular product, domestic industries which pro-
duce these products are insulated from import competition.
The elimination of import competition within the excluding coun-
try causes the domestic price of the restricted product to rise, because
domestic demand for the restricted product remains constant or in-
creases while the domestic supply decreases. However, the price of
the restricted product decreases within the remaining markets, since
the supply of the restricted product within those markets is increased
by the quantity which was produced to be sold within the excluding
country.1 6
14. Bergsten, Let's Avoid a Trade War, 23 FoREIGN POLICY 24, 29-31 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Bergsten Trade War].
15. Supra note 2.
16. See HARoD ECONOMICS, supra note 2, at 31-32, 44-49; MALMOMEN PEACEKEEP-
1976]
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The use of excluders also causes misallocation of the world's pro-
ductive factors. Imports enjoy comparative advantages over domestic
products because foreign producers are more efficient than domestic
producers. The elimination of import competition shifts domestic sales
of the restricted product from efficient foreign producers to inefficient
domestic producers. As a result of this sales shift, a greater amount of
the world's productive resources must be expended if worldwide pro-
duction of the restricted product is to remain at the level which existed
prior to the excluding country's implementation of excluders. 17
Quantitative restrictions and similar limitations on imports' 8 are the
classic excluders. Other NTB's which may fall into this category in-
clude nontariff charges on imports,19 government procurement policies
that give preferences to domestic products, health and product safety
standards,20 and customs procedures.2'
Withholders
Withholders are NTB's which prevent the exportation of domestic
products either directly, by imposing quantitative restrictions on the
amount of exports, or indirectly, by raising the prices of the exports to
levels which render them uncompetitive in the world market. Included
within this category of NTB's are export licensing requirements, export
quotas, embargoes, export restraints, exchange and other monetary
controls, restrictive business policies, discriminatory bilateral agree-
ments, "border" taxes, and export taxes and fees.
The application of withholders to a product causes that product's
domestic price to decrease and its world price to increase. These price
iNG, supra note 11, at 83, 122-31; SAMUELSON, supra note 2, at 657; Baldwin Non-
Tariff Distortions, supra note 8, at 644.
17. Id.
18. Quantitative restrictions and similar limitations on imports include such prac-
tices as licensing requirements, quotas, embargoes, exchange and other monetary or fi-
nancial controls, minimum/maximum price regulations, local content and mixing re-
quirements, restrictive business requirements, discriminatory bilateral agreements, and
discriminatory sourcing. 4 TRADE COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 13, at 3.
19. Nontariff charges on imports include "border" taxes, port and statistical taxes,
use and excise taxes, registration fees, government controlled insurance, film taxes, com-
modity taxes, sales taxes, prior import deposits, variable levies, consular fees, and stamp
taxes. Id.
20. Health and product safety standards include pharmaceutical standards, product
content requirements, processing standards, industrial standards, requirements on weights
and measures, labeling and'container requirements, marking requirements, packaging re-
quirements, and trademark problems. Id.
21. Customs procedures include antidumping practices, customs valuation, consular
formalities, documentation requirements, classification of merchandise, regulations on
samples, returned goods and reexports, and countervailing levies. Id.
[Vol. 12:1
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changes are the result of a relatively constant demand for the product
within and without the withholding country, coupled with an increase
in the domestic supply and a decrease in foreign supply.22
Withholders also create misallocations of the world's productive
resources. In the long run, domestic producers in the withholding
country reduce their production of the restricted product to conform to
the smaller size of their markets. During the same period, foreign pro-
ducers increase their output of the restricted product to fill the world-
wide supply gap created by the discontinuation of exports from the
withholding country. Thus, in the withholding country productive re-
sources are shifted away from an efficient industry, and the remaining
countries' productive resources are shifted to inefficient industries.23
The degree to which withholders dislocate the world's economy
depends upon the nature of the products withheld and the scope of the
export restrictions on those products. The use of withholders produces
a minimal impact on world trade if the product is one for which substi-
tutes or other sources of supply are readily available. On the other
hand, the massive recession that followed in the wake of the worldwide
oil embargo of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) illustrates the disastrous economic dislocations which may re-
sult from the use of withholders when the product is vital to all eco-
nomic enterprises, has no effective substitutes, and is withheld from
the world market by all or most of its suppliers.2 4
22. Walter, Barriers to International Competition: The Nature of Nontariff Distor-
tions, in THE UNrrED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL IA4KsTS-COMMERCIAL POLICY
OPTIONS IN AN AGE OF CONTROLS 63, 71 (R. Hawkins & I. Walter eds. 1972) [herein-
after cited as Walter Nature of NTB's]. See R. BALDwIN, NoNTARIF DISTORTIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 30 n.2 (1970) [hereinafter cited as BALDwIN NTB's]; PRnno
BLocS, supra note 7, at 76, 155.
23. See note 16 supra.
24. Walter Nature of NTB's, supra note 22. See Amuzegar, The North-South Dia-
logue: From Conflict to Compromise, 54 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 547, 561 & n.10 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as North-South Dialogue]. A principal negotiating objective of the
United States during the current GATT negotiations is to insure against other countries
applying withholders to prevent the United States from obtaining "fair and equitable
access at reasonable prices to supplies of articles of commerce which are important to
[its] economic requirements . . . and for which [it] does not have, or cannot easily
develop, the necessary domestic productive capacity to supply its requirements." Trade
Act of 1974 § 108, 19 U.S.C. § 2118(a) (Supp. IV 1974). The United States' concern
over access to supplies is also reflected in its intent to deny the benefits of its Gen-
eralized System of Preferences to any developing country which belongs to the Organiza-
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries, or to any other organization of which the United
States is not a member that takes measures to deny the United States access to vital
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Handicappers
Handicappers are NTB's which partially destroy the advantages
products enjoy over their competitors by increasing the sales prices of
the handicapped products to a point near that at which they are totally
uncompetitive. This category of NTB's includes all NTB's mentioned
as possible excluders or withholders which cause increases in the prices
of internationally traded goods. By definition, handicappers do not re-
strict international trade as greatly as excluders and withholders.25
Handicappers do not create absolute ceilings on the entry of products
into international markets; therefore, producers can reduce the nega-
tive impact handicappers have on international sales by becoming more
efficient. 26 Unlike excluders and withholders, handicappers also gen-
erate revenues for the countries which use them. 7
Promoters
Promoters are actions or policies that allow producers to offer their
products in international markets on better terms than would be pos-
sible if normal market conditions prevailed. Into this category of
NTB's falls government assumption of all or part of a domestic produc-
er's capital, production or marketing expenses. Such government ac-
tions include export and domestic subsidies, exchange rate preferences
for exports, remission of direct taxes, remission of indirect taxes in ex-
cess of those assessed on the promoted product, government delivery of
goods below the prevailing world delivery price, government sponsored
insurance with below-average premiums, guaranteed credit at less than
market rates, government assumption of the cost of acquiring credit,
government financing of promotional schemes, and tax incentives de-
signed to encourage exportation.2 8 Producers sometimes engage in in-
ternational price discrimination, a promoter commonly referred to as
dumping, by charging a high price for a product in a market in which
25. In fact, handicappers may not reduce the volume of trade of a product for which
the demand is relatively inelastic. See HARROD EcoNoMics, supra note 2, at 31-32.
26. This conclusion is based on material contrasting the trade effects of tariffs and
quantitative restrictions. This material should also be applicable to handicappers, since,
like tariffs, they affect trade through the price mechanism. See K. DAM, Tun GATT
LAw AND INTERNATONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 148-49 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as DA GATI].
27. BALDwIN NTB's, supra note 22, at 33; H. MALMGREN, TRADE FOR DEVELOP-
MENT 35 (1971) [hereinafter cited as MALMGRN TRADE]. See SAMUELSON, supra note 2,
at 671, 675; Baldwin Non-Tariff Distortions, supra note 8, at 657.
28. See GoLT GUIDE, supra note 5, at 34; Baldwin Non-Tariff Distortions, supra
note 8, at 647; Malmgren & Marks Negotiating, supra note 11, at 348.
[Vol. 12:1
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they have a competitive advantage to offset the losses they incur by
charging a lower price for the same product in a market in which they
are seeking entry or a stronger position.29
Promoters misallocate productive resources to the extent that they
enable inefficient producers to capture business which would have gone
to more efficient producers under normal market conditions. This is
particularly true in cases where promoters are all that prevent an ineffi-
cient producer from going out of business.30 However, there are in-
stances when promoters allow producers to overcome short-run prob-
lems. These instances are cases where producers require government
aid in order to purchase capital equipment needed for modernization"'
or to finance foreign promotion of products which have a comparative
advantage over domestic products, but suffer from low consumer fa-
miliarity. 2 Whatever their effects may be on the allocation of produc-
tive resources, promoters increase international price competition,
thereby increasing the incentive for producers to become more effi-
cient.33  Consequently, those who consume the promoted products are
provided with a greater range of choices at or below the previously pre-
vailing market prices.
ILLUSTRATIVE NTB's
The use of NTB's creates a myriad of international trade prob-
lems. Since the list of NTB's is limitless, the depth and diversity of the
trade problems can best be illustrated by focusing upon three prom-
29. BALDwrN NTB's, supra note 22, at 141.
30. Id. at 48. See also Baldwin Non-Tariff Distortions, supra note 8, at 657-58;
Malmgren & Marks Negotiating, supra note 11, at 347.
31. For example, governments often use nontariff barriers to establish and protect
new industries which they hope will displace imports and eventually become competitive
in international markets. See HARROD EcoNoMVcs, supra note 2, at 44-48; KENEN Eco-
NoMacs, supra note 2, at 28-29; SAmuELsoN, supra note 2, at 677-78. Most developed
countries would prefer that developing countries would utilize subsidies to aid their in-
fant industries rather than impose restrictions on imports. G. VERBIT, TRADE AGREE-
NMNTS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 157 (1969) [hereinafter cited as VF.Rurr TRADE
AGREEMENTS].
32. It has been noted that marketing competition is assuming a greater importance
in international trade than price competition. See S. WEINvr.AIm, TRADE PREFERENCES
FOR LEss-DEVELOPED CouNTREs: AN ANALYSIS OF UNTED STATES POLICY 120 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as WEINTRAUB PREFERENCES]. Robert Baldwin has suggested that
governments should bear the losses of developing new markets for industries which
should become competitive in the world market. Baldwin Non-Tariff Distortions, supra
note 8, at 657.
33. See Malmgren & Marks Negotiating, supra note 11, at 347; Comment, The
Anti-Dumping Act of 1921: Primary Lead Metal and the Injury Standard, 10 TEx.
INT'L L.J. 357, 364 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Antidumping Comment].
1976]
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inent NTB's: the import quota, buy-national policies and border tax
adjustments.
Import Quota
The import quota belongs to the category of NTB's which is most
disruptive of trade. This category includes all excluders which impose
absolute ceilings on the quantity of the restricted product allowed to
enter the domestic market from foreign sources. Such restrictions pre-
vent the foreign supplier from acquiring an increased share of the do-
mestic market through greater production efficiency and prevent the
domestic consumer from choosing to purchase imports over their
cheaper domestic counterparts.34
The import quota may be administered on a global or an allocated
basis. Global quotas fix the permissible quantity of imports without
reference to the sources of supply. Allocated quotas designate permit-
ted suppliers and allot specific shares of the total quota to each.85 In
theory, global quotas are non-discriminatory in the sense that only com-
mercial considerations such as price and quality should govern which
suppliers receive which shares of the total quota amount.30 In practice,
global quotas make it difficult for each supplier to estimate what share
of the domestic market it will be able to capture. The resulting uncer-
34. Restrictions on import items increase demand and raise the prices which those
with permission to import are able to charge. BALD N NTB's, supra note 22, at 32-
33; J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAw OF GATT § 13.1, at 305 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as JACKSON WORLD TAmDE].
35. VERBrr TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 31, at 68-69. See Wall, Opportunities
for Developing Countries, in TRADE STRATEoY FOR RICH AND POOR NATONS 25, 35 (H.
Johnson ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Wall Opportunities].
36. The GATT requires that quotas be applied on a non-discriminatory basis as
follows:
No prohibition or restriction shall be applied by any contracting party
on the importation of any product . . . of any other contracting party . ..
unless the importation of the like product of all third countries . . . is sum-
larly prohibited or restricted.
GATr, art. XIII, para. 1. This non-discrimination requirement is fulfilled when the
following rule is complied with:
In applying import restrictions to any product, contracting parties shall aim at
a distribution of trade in such product approaching as closely as possible the
shares which the various contracting parties might be expected to obtain in
the absence of such restrictions ....
GATT, art. XIII, para. 2. Furthermore, GATT appears to favor global quotas as the
import restriction best suited for achieving the desired trade distribution since:
No mention was made of "commercial considerations" as a rule for the
allocation of quotas because it was considered that its application by govern-
mental authorities might not always be practicable ....
GAIT, annex I, ad art. XIII, para. 2(d) (emphasis added). See JACKSON WORLD
TRADE, supra note 34, § 13.5 at 323, 327.
10
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 12 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol12/iss1/1
1976] NONTARIFF TRADE BARRIERS
tainty causes a surplus of imports to develop within the domestic market
early in the quota period, as each supplier rushes its goods to port in
an attempt to maximize its sales before the quota is exhausted. 7 This
race to market favors suppliers who are first to market, regardless of
whether they are the most efficient producers of the restricted prod-
uct.8 8  As the quota period ends, shortages may develop as suppliers,
fearful of having their goods excluded at the port due to quota exhaus-
tion, reduce shipments to the importing country. 9 While the use of al-
located quotas relieves the suppliers' market share uncertainty, it also
raises the issue of how the quota shares should be allotted. Quotas
which are not allotted on the basis of past market shares may be con-
demned as discriminatory. 40 On the other hand, quotas allotted solely
on the basis of past market shares prevent new and increasingly more
efficient suppliers from receiving the share of the market they would
have captured in the absence of quotas.41
Buy-National Government Procurement Policies
All nations exercise buy-national policies with respect to the pur-
chase of goods for governmental use.42  Such discriminatory policies
37. JACKSON WORLD TRADE, supra note 34; VERBrr TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note
31, at 68.
38. JACKSON WORLD TRADE, supra note 34, at 323.
39. See VERnrr TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 31, at 68.
40. The GATT rules for allocating quotas among suppliers state a preference for
the importing country and its suppliers attempting to reach an agreement as to the
quota's allocation. If such an agreement cannot be reached, the importing country is
to allot quota shares among the suppliers on the basis of their historical market shares,
giving appropriate consideration for any special factors in the market which affect the
trade in the restricted product. GATr, art. XII, para. 2(d).
41. JACKSON WoRLD TRADE, supra note 34, at 324; VERnrr TRADE AGREEMENTS,
supra note 31, at 69. The Contracting Parties dealt with this problem by drafting an
interpretative note to explain the meaning of the special factors requirement in the
GAT quota allocation rules, as follows:
The term "special factors" includes changes in relative productive effi-
ciency as between domestic and foreign producers, or as between different
foreign producers, but not changes artificially brought about by means not
permitted under the Agreement.
GATT, annex I, ad art. XIII, para. 4, incorporating by reference ad art. XI, para. 2.
See also MALMGREN PEACEKEEPING, supra note 11, at 149-50 which suggests that alloca-
tion formulas also take into account the annual growth of the importing country's econ-
omy.
42. Discriminatory government procurement systems are approved by GATT.
GATT art. I, para. 8(a) specially exempts government procurement policies from the
GATT requirement that nations not apply their
laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for
sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products . . . to im-
ported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production.
See GAT, art. III, para. 1. GAiT, art. XVII, para. 2 exempts government procure-
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restrict international trade because each government is its nation's larg-
est single consumer.43 Buy-national policies are especially restrictive
when they are operated in a manner which negates the comparative ad-
vantages imports have over domestic products.
The Buy-American Act of 1933 constitutes the backbone of the
United States' buy-national program." On its face, this act grants do-
mestic suppliers an absolute preference over foreign suppliers with re-
spect to government purchases, except in cases where such a prefer-
ence would be unreasonably expensive or against the public interest."
However, the procurement regulations established for the administra-
tion of the Buy-American Act state that the purchase of domestic goods
is unreasonable and inconsistent with the public interest in cases where
the low domestic bid exceeds the low foreign bid by six percent (twelve
percent if the low domestic bid is from a small business concern" or a
ment from the GATT requirement that state trading enterprises are to be operated "in
a manner consistent with the general principles of non-discriminatory treatment pre-
scribed . . . [by GATE] for governmental measures affecting imports or exports by
private traders. . . ..." GAIT, art. XVII, para. l(a). Government procurers need not
"make any . . purchases or sales solely in accordance with commercial considerations
.... " GAIT, art. XVII, para. I(b). Within some nations, subnational governments
also practice discriminatory procurement. BALDWIN NTB's, supra note 22, at 68 & n.16.
Within the United States some state and local governments have discriminatory pro-
curement policies. Id. at 68. However, such subnational procurement policies have
been held invalid by every court which has ruled on the question of their legality.
Malmgren & Marks Negotiating, supra note 11, at 400. In Bethlehem Steel Corp. v.
Board of Comm'rs, 276 Cal. App. 2d 221, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1969), a California Buy-
American statute was invalidated on the grounds that it was unconstitutional and that
the power of the federal government in foreign affairs is inherent, exclusive, and plenary.
43. It has been estimated that 25 to 40% of most nations' gross national products
pass through their public budgets. DAmt GAT, supra note 26, at 199. In the United
States, government purchases represent approximately 21% of the gross national prod-
uct. See 4 TRADE COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 13, at 56.
44. Buy-American Act § 212, 41 U.S.C. § 10a (1970).
45. The Act provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and unless the head of the
department or independent establishment concerned shall determine it to be
inconsistent with the public interest, or the cost to be unreasonable, only such
unmanufactured articles, materials, and supplies as have been mined or pro-
duced in the United States, and only such manufactured articles, materials,
and supplies as have been manufactured in the United States substantially allfrom articles, materials, or .supplies mined, produced, or manufactured, as the
case may be, in the United States, shall be acquired for public use ...
Buy-American Act, § 2, 41 U.S.C. § 10a (1970) (emphasis added). See also Buy-
American Act § 3a, 41 U.S.C. § 10b(a) (1970) requiring that contractors, subcon-
tractors, materialmen, or suppliers shall use only articles, materials and supplies of
United States origin, as determined in accordance with Section 10a of the Buy-American
Act, in performing contracts for the construction, alteration, or repair of a public build-
ing or public work in the United States.
46. See Federal Procurement Regulations, 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.701 (1976) for the defi-
nition of a small business concern.
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labor surplus area concern,47 or if the award exceeds $100,000 and the
twelve percent figure would allow a domestic firm to receive it, which
otherwise would not be so).48 If this Buy-American Act price handi-
cap were the only restriction placed on imports, the United States' pro-
curement practices would have a small impact on foreign trade. De-
partment heads are granted broad discretion in administering the Act,49
and have increased the import price handicap up to fifty percent during
a period of balance of payments difficulties."0 Other restrictions are
imposed upon imports by procurement policies falling outside the scope
of the Buy-American Act.51 The combined force of these procure-
ment restrictions produces a bias against imports equivalent to that
which would result from a forty-two percent tariff duty.52
Bidding practices are the chief sources of import exclusion within
government procurement systems. 53 There are three widely recog-
nized forms of bidding practices; the public tender, the selective ten-
der, and the single tender.54  The public tenders are the least discrim-
inatory, since they are invitations to the public-at-large to submit bids.55
Conversely, under selective and single tenders, low-cost suppliers may
47. See Federal Procurement Regulations, 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.801 (1976) for the defi-
nition of a labor surplus area concern.
48. Federal Procurement Regulations, 41 C.F.R. § 1-6.104-4 (1976). Similar re-
quirements are specified for purposes of awarding bids on construction contracts in ac-
cordance with the Buy-American Act. See Federal Procurement Regulations, 41 C.F.R.
§ 1-18.603-1 (1976).
49. Federal Procurement Regulations, 41 C.F.R. § 1-6.104-4(d) (1976) specifies
that "Deviations from the requirements of . . . § 1-6.104-4 may be authorized by the
head of the agency in accordance with the Buy-American Act and Executive Order No.
10582, as amended."
50. See BALDWiN NTB's, supra note 22, at 67; DAM GATT, supra note 26, at 202-
03.
51. Government agencies impose a 50% price handicap on imports in making pur-
chases of articles, materials, supplies, and services to be used outside the United States.
Federal Procurement Regulations, 41 C.F.R. § 1-6.801 (1976). The requirements of
the Small Business Act § 2[2], 14 U.S.C. § 631 (1970), result in nearly 20% of al
civilian procurements being awarded to small business. See Malmgren & Marks Nego-
tiating, supra note 11, at 399-400 n.318. The Defense Department is prohibited from
procuring food, clothing, cotton, woven silk or woven silk blends, spun silk yarn for
cartridge cloth, synthetic fabric or coated synthetic fabric, wool, or specialty metals from
foreign sources. Dept. of Defense Appropriation Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-437, §
823, 88 Stat. 1212.
52. 4 TRADE CoMMIssioN REPORT, supra note 13, at 59. The United States' dis-
criminatory government procurement policies also inflict heavy costs on the taxpayers.
In 1954, it was estimated that each year the Buy-American Act cost the United States
government $100,000,000 in higher prices and another $100,000,000 in foregone customs
revenues. See DAM GATr, supra note 26, at 199 n.1.
53. See 4 TRADE COMMISSION REPoRT, supra note 13, at 57.
54. Id.
55. See B.LDwiN NTB's, supra note 22, at 59-60.
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be eliminated from the bidding process in the discretion of the pur-
chaser.56 Unfortunately for world trade, the selective and single ten-
der systems are more prevalently used for government procurements.57
Even when the public tender system is employed, discrimination
against imports can arise if the notice of the intent to purchase gives in-
adequate information from which to prepare a bid, or is timed so close
to the final bid submission date that foreign suppliers do not have ade-
quate time within which to prepare a proper bid. 8
Border Tax Adjustments
Any tax which is shifted forward onto consumers raises the price
of the taxed product, reducing its competitiveness in international mar-
kets. Since every country has an internal taxing system, internationally
traded goods face potentially crippling double taxation from both the
importing and the exporting countries. The method of avoidance of
this double tax is a subject of considerable disagreement. A major dis-
pute concerns the question of which taxes are shifted forward and are
therefore reflected in the taxed article's price. Historically, econo-
mists have believed that indirect taxes are shifted forward and that di-
rect taxes are borne completely by the producer 'or are shifted back-
ward to be borne by labor or capital.5 9 This economic belief is the un-
derlying rationale behind GATT rules which allow indirect but not di-
rect taxes to be adjusted.6" GATT's unequal treatment of direct and
indirect taxes is criticized by those countries, especially the United
States, which rely heavily on direct taxes to generate government reve-
56. Id., at 60-61.
57. Id. For a brief summary of the procurement policies of each major trading
nation, see Comment, The Buy-American Act: Examination, Analysis, and Compari-
sons, 64 M.. L. REV. 101, 141-46 (1974).
58. See BAL.wnN NTB's, supra note 22, at 61-63.
59. Indirect taxes are those applied to the output of productive processes such as
sales taxes, excise taxes, and value added taxes. Direct taxes are applied directly to
income such as corporate income taxes and profits taxes. See DAM GATr, supra note
26, at 214-15; JACKSON WORLD TRADE, supra note 34, § 12.7, at 301 n.26; Malmgren
& Marks Negotiating, supra note 11, at 351.
60. The relevant GATT rules are art. M, para. 2, requiring that imports and like
domestic products receive equal tax treatment in the importing country; art. II, para.
2(a) permitting importing countries to impose upon imports the same tax they impose
upon like domestic products; and art. VI, para. 4, which provides that antidumping or
countervailing duties cannot be applied to imports from countries which exempt their
exports from the taxes applied to like products sold in their domestic markets. Since
these rules uniformly refer to the taxing of products, they have been interpreted as apply-
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nues. 61 These countries point to more recent studies which indicate
that while there may not be a connection between direct taxes and con-
sumer prices, it is practically certain that indirect taxes are not com-
pletely shifted forward.62 To the extent that direct taxes are shifted
forward and indirect taxes are not, the present GATT rules discrim-
inate against the countries which make heavy use of direct taxes.63
Another troublesome border adjustment problem is how to calcu-
late the amount of tax to be imposed on imports and removed from ex-
ports. This problem arises because, to the extent that tax adjustments
are overestimated, imported goods are handicapped and exported
goods are promoted."4 The calculations problem is most apparent in
countries which have cascade-type turnover taxes. Turnover taxes are
those levied on the total value of a product at each transaction the prod-
uct passes through, from its initial production stage until the final retail
stage.65 Thus, the tax burden a specific item bears depends on the de-
gree to which its manufacturer is vertically integrated, which may vary
widely from manufacturer to manufacturer.6 6  Calculation problems
also result when countries attempt to include as a part of the tax burden
borne by end-products the indirect taxes assessed on capital equipment
and other items expended in producing the end-products.6 7  Obviously,
such calculations problems make it difficult for a country to determine,
with any degree of accuracy, the tax rate it applies to like domestic
products so that adjustments can be made in accordance with GATT
61. The United States is sufficiently disturbed about the bias it feels current GATT
rules impose upon direct tax countries that the Trade Act of 1974 specifically provides
the negotiating authority to the President to seek, "the revision of GATT articles with
respect to the treatment of border adjustments for internal taxes to redress the disad-
vantage to countries relying primarily on direct rather than indirect taxes for revenue
needs" (emphasis added). Trade Act of 1974, § 121 (a) (5), 19 U.S.C. § 2131(a) (5)
(Supp. IV 1974).
62. DAm GATr, supra note 26, at 214-16. Actually, empirical data on the question
of which direction a particular tax shifts is fairly inconclusive. JACKSON WOL "T1ADE,
supra note 34, § 12.7, at 301; 5 UNrrED STATES INTERNATONAL TRADE COMMISSION,
REPORT ON TRADE BARRIms 42 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 5 TRADE COMMISSION RE-
PORT]. The available empirical data indicate that if shifting occurs, the degree of the
shift depends upon the demand for the product, the actions of monetary and fiscal au-
thorities, the stage of the business cycle, the degree to which producers are oligopalistic,
etc. Id.
63. Id.
64. See DAM GATT, supra note 26, at 212.
65. Liesner, Harmonization Issues Under Free Trade, in TRADE STEGrY FoR RiCH
AND POOR NATIONS, 95, 136 (H. Johnson ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Liesner Har-
monization].
66. See DAM GATI, supra note 26, at 212.
67. These include such taxes as sales taxes on stationery, motor vehicle license lev-
ies, and taxes on fuel sources. Supra note 65, at 138.
19761
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rules. This leads to the use of arbitrary averaging procedures for esti-
mating assessed taxes which, in turn, generates criticism that the aver-
aging procedures subsidize exports and handicap imports. S
Relieving internationally traded goods from double taxation re-
quires agreement among trading partners as to whether such goods
should be relieved of the taxes of the importing country (origin princi-
ple) or the exporting country (destination principle). Under the or-
igin principle, there are no border adjustments, so .the adjustment prob-
lems previously discussed do not exist.69 Eliminating border adjust-
ments disputes should provide a strong incentive for the trading nations
to embrace the origin principle, but most have not done so because of
the differences between the origin and destination principles in their
effects on international trade.70 Under the origin principle, each na-
tion applies its tax structure only to the products of its domestic produc-
ers.71 Imports bear only the tax burdens of the country from which
they are exported. 72 As a consequence, any change a nation makes in
its tax rates applies only to the prices of domestically produced prod-
ucts.73 Domestic businessmen and workers oppose the origin principle
because tax increases raise the prices of domestically produced prod-
ucts above the prices of similar foreign products, thereby transferring
business and jobs from domestic industries to their foreign competi-
tors. 74 Furthermore, nations generally apply selective taxes on certain
industries as a means of controlling domestic consumption patterns, 75 or
to raise extra revenues. 76 Under the origin principle, a nation's selec-
tive tax policies are rendered ineffective if other countries apply lower
tax rates to the targeted products, and the relative efficiencies between
domestic producers and foreign producers are approximately equal. 77
68. See DAM GATT, supra note 26, at 212.
69. Liesner Harmonization, supra note 65, at 136-37. The elimination of border
adjustments also eliminates the administrative delays associated with the tax frontiers
which must be maintained to make border adjustments effective. Id.
70. Id. at 133-34. Thus, GAIT contains rules permitting the border adjustments
required by the destination principle. See note 60 supra.
71. This is so regardless of whether the domestic products are described for domestic
or international markets. BALDwiN NTB's, supra note 22, at 88.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 91, 101-02.
74. However, it must be remembered that if the tax rates are those of general indi-
rect taxes (i.e., those applying across the board to all product lines), the initial shift
in trade balances and patterns will be offset by economic forces such as flexible wages
and currency exchange rates. See Id. at 91-92; 5 TRADE COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 62, at 56.
75. Liesner Harmonization, supra note 65, at 135.
76. See BALDwIN NTB's, supra note 22, at 103.
77. Liesner Harmonization, supra note 65, at 135.
[Vol. 12:1
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In contrast, under the destination principle, a nation's tax rates do not
affect the foreign competitiveness of its products, since such taxes apply
equally to the nation's domestic products, and their foreign competitors
within the domestic markets, and do not apply at all to the nation's ex-
ports. 78 Thus, the destination principle, unlike the origin principle, is
consistent with free trade because it insures that within each nation's
markets the differences between the prices of imports and domestic
products are attributable only to efficiency differences among produc-
ers.
79
WHY TRADE DISTORTIONS EXIST
Notwithstanding the negative impacts NTB's have on international
trade and the world's real income level, each nation has contributed to
the creation of the present labyrinth of NTB's. Since the end of the
Kennedy Round, NTB's have become increasingly important in terms
of their use and the attention they receive in international trading cir-
cles. The rising prominence of NTB's is, in part, due to the decline of
tariff barriers,80 but it is primarily attributable to the rising tide of pro-
tectionism engendered by recent international economic crises, 8 ' and
the fact that governments are becoming more active in managing the
social and economic affairs of their countries.8 2 As a consequence, be-
fore the trade practices of any country are attacked it is important that
negotiators thoroughly understand the purposes served by the target
country's trade distortions.
Political Expediency
NTB's are often the most politically expedient means of solving
governmental problems. A prime example is the almost universal use
of NTB's to correct balance of payments disequilibriums. 83 NTB's
78. Id. at 133.
79. Id.
80. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, POLIcY
PERSPEcTIVES FOp INTERNATIONAL TRADE, 1 173, at 60 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
OECD POLIcY]; Patterson GATT, supra note 10, at 620.
81. See GOLT GUIDE, supra note 5, at 3; Bergsten Trade War, supra note 14.
82. See OECD POLICY, supra note 80; Malmgren & Marks Negotiating, supra note
11, at 328.
83. Recent examples of trading nations using NTB's to alleviate balance of pay-
ments difficulties include France's general imposition of import quotas in 1968, the
United Kingdom's use of prior import deposits from 1967 through 1969, and the United
States' import duty surcharge of 1971. Hawkins & Walter, Trends in International Com-
mercial Policy-Implications for the United States, in Thn UNrrED STATES AND INTERNA-
19761
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correct balance of payments problems by restricting the international
trade of products from surplus countries and promoting the interna-
tional trade of products from deficit countries. Unfortunately, this so-
lution reduces world income levels to the extent that the comparative
advantages enjoyed by products of surplus countries are destroyed.
Less trade-restrictive balance of payments solutions include domestic
economic policies which are appropriate to each nation's balance of
payments condition, 4 and exchange rate adjustments to insure that the
value of each country's currency accurately reflects its true international
buying power. 85 However, each of the foregoing balance of payments
solutions presents certain disadvantages to the government considering
using them. Within countries experiencing business stagnation and
high levels of unemployment, it is politically impossible to maintain re-
strictions on economic growth for extended periods of time.80 Balance
of payments adjustments are usually considered admissions of govern-
mental failure8 7 and can result in violent shifts in the adjusting country's
patterns of income distribution.88 Additionally, constantly adjusting
exchange rates make it difficult for international trade to be conducted
with any degree of certainty as to the values of the transactions being
made.89 In contrast, by using NTB's as balance of payments controls,
a country confines income distribution shifts to discrete sectors of the
TIONAL MIARKETS-COMMERCAL POLICY OPTIONS IN AN AGE OF CONTROLS 1, 7 (R.
Hawkins & I. Walter eds. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Hawkins & Walter Trends].
84. In general, deficit countries should restrain policies which are inflationary and
stimulate growth while surplus countries should adopt reverse policies. See PREEG
BLOCS, supra note 7, at 45; E. SHAPIRO, MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 355-57 (1966).
85. In other words, exchange rates are in part signals as to the attractiveness of
each nation's products in international markets. The less attractive a nation's products
are within international markets, the less value its currency should have vis-a-vis other
currencies. See J. RANLETT, MONEY AND BANKING: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS AND
POLICY, 352-56 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RANLETT MONEY AND BANKING].
86. See Hawkins & Walter Trends, supra note 83; PREEG BLOCS, supra note 7, at 20.
87. See VERBIT TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 31, at 83.
88. This is because exchange rate adjustments affect the entire economy. Devalua-
tions cause an income redistribution from importers and import consumers to exporters
and export products. Revaluations produce an opposite income distribution shift. If
adjustments are sufficiently large, violent economic dislocations can arise in a country's
domestic economy. See PREEG BLOCS, supra note 7, at 27; VERBIT TRADE AGREEMENTS,
supra note 31, at 83; Erb, New Trade and Monetary Systems, in THE U.S. AND THE
DEVELOPING WORLD: AGENDA FOR ACTION, 30, 32 (Overseas Development Council ed.
1973) [hereinafter cited as Erb Systems].
89. This is implicit from the fact that every change in exchange rates reduces the
value of some currencies relative to others. Therefore, constant shifts in exchange rates
introduce an element of uncertainty into international transactions since traders cannot
be sure that the value of their agreements will remain constant over time. See RANLETr
MONEY AND BANKING, supra note 85, at 372-73.
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economy,90 avoids politically embarrassing exchange rate adjustments,
and gains some flexibility in pursuing policies of economic growth. 1 In
view of this political context, it is understandable that the use of quanti-
tative restrictions for balance of payments purposes is a major exception
to GATT's general ban on quantitative restrictions. 2
Nations often choose to control domestic inflation by imposing
export controls on economically important products, such as food and
raw materials, instead of resorting to unpopular deflationary measures,
such as raising interest rates.9 3  Such action allows a nation to reduce
its inflation without depressing its entire economy by exporting its infla-
tion to its trading partners. 4 GATT indirectly approves of the use of
90. See PREEG BLOCS, supra note 7, at 27; VE3rIT TRADE AGREEmENTS, supra note
31, at 84, 92.
91. This fact is given explicit recognition in the GATT balance of payment rules
which provide that
as a result of domestic policies directed towards the achievement and main-
tenance of full and productive employment or towards the development of
economic resources, a contracting party may experience a high level of de-
mand for imports involving a threat to its monetary reserves . . . . Accord-
ingly, a contracting party . . . shall not be required to withdraw or modify
restrictions on the ground that a change in those policies would render un-
necessary restrictions which it is applying under this Article (emphasis added).
GAT, art. XII, para. 3(d).
92. The balance of payments exception to GAT's ban on the use of quantitative
restrictions permits nations to impose import restrictions in order to safeguard their ex-
ternal finances and balances of payments. GATT, art. XII, para. 1. This exception
is not unqualified, since import restrictions may not exceed those necessary to prevent
a serious decline in monetary reserves or achieve a reasonable increase in monetary
reserves if they are at a very low level. GATr, art. XII, para. 2(a). Less-developed
countries having economies which can only support low standards of living and are in
the early stages of development are subject to somewhat less strict qualifications on
their use of import restrictions for balance of payments purposes. These less-developed
countries may impose import restrictions to prevent a threat, rather than an imminent
threat, of a decline in their monetary reserves, (compare GAT, art. XII, para. 2(a) (i)
with GATr, art. XVIII, para. 9(a)) and to achieve a reasonable increase in inadequate,
as opposed to very low level, monetary reserves (compare GAT, art. XII, para. 2(a)
(ii) with GAT, art. XVIII, para. 9(b)). All balance of payments import restrictions
are to be applied on a nondiscrminatory basis, GAT, art. XIII (See discussion at
note 36 supra), unless they are used in lieu of restrictions on international payments
and transfers authorized by the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) or a special exchange agreement between the Contracting Parties at GATT
and a contracting party not a member of the IMF. GAT, art. XIV, para. 1. The
IM]F is to be consulted on trade matters involving monetary reserves, balances of pay-
ments, or foreign exchange arrangements, GAT, art. XV, para. 1 & 2, and the con-
tracting parties are bound by IMF findings of fact and IMF determinations as to what
constitutes a serious decline in monetary reserves, a very low level of monetary re-
serves, inadequate monetary reserves, a reasonable increase in monetary reserves, etc.
GAT, art. XV, para. 2.
93. See PREEG BLOCS, supra note 7, at 152.
94. Within the nation's domestic economy, only the sector producing the restricted
product is adversely affected. Inflation is exported because export controls decrease
the international supply of the restricted product, thereby raising its international price.
See note 22 supra.
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export controls for purposes of controlling inflation in rules that broadly
state the rights of nations to use export controls to accumulate adequate
supplies of economically important resources. One rule permits the
use of export controls to prevent the export of materials having domes-
tic prices held below their world prices as a part of a government's gen-
eral price stabilization plan.95 Another rule flatly announces the right
of nations to impose controls to acquire or distribute products in general
or local short supply, as long as the rights of others to an equitable share
of such products are cared for.96 Although the language of this rule is
quite broad, it only applies to instances where shortages or surpluses
are created by war or natural catastrophe. 97  The most important of
these rules is a major exception to GATT's general ban on the use of
quantitative restrictions. It condones the temporary use of export re-
strictions "to'prevent or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or other
products essential to the exporting contracting party.""' What consti-
tutes critical shortages or essential products are questions open to sub-
jective interpretation, but generally a critical shortage is present when
an item's price rises considerably because of a rise in prices abroad,
and essential products are exhaustible natural resources. 99 In this
age of diminishing resources, it is unfortunate these GATT rules on
export restrictions are so vague and subject to varying interpretations.
It is particularly unfortunate that the short-supply exception to the ban
on quantitative restrictions is not qualified by a requirement that prod-
ucts in short supply be distributed equitably among all nations. Supply
restraints on essential resources can produce severe dislocations in the
world economy, as the aftermath of the OPEC countries' oil embargo
so graphically demonstrated. Under these circumstances, it is under-
standable that the United States has enacted contradictory laws which,
on one hand, declare its right to impose controls on products in short
supply, 100 and, on the other, reserve its right to retaliate against nations
95. GATT, art. XX, para. (i). See JACKSON WoRLD TRADE, supra note 34, § 19.2,
at 504-06.
96. GAT', art. XX, para. ().
97. See JACKSON WORLD TRADE, supra note 34, § 28.3.
98. GATE, art. XI, para. 2(a). The United States took advantage of this rule in
1973 by imposing export controls on most food products. See PREao BLOCS, supra note
7, at 155 (emphasis added).
99. See JACKSON WORLD TRADE, supra note 34, § 13.4, at 316-17.
100. The Export Administration Amendments of 1974, § 2, 50 App. U.S.C. § 2402
(2) (Supp. IV 1974), give the United States the right "to use export controls ...
to the extent necessary to protect the domestic economy from the excessive drain of
scarce materials and to reduce the serious inflationary impact of foreign demand ... .
This section amended the Export Administration Act of 1969, § 3(2), 50 App. U.S.C.
['Vol. 12:1
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it feels unfairly deny the United States access to such products. 101
Protectionism
Although free trade suffers from political expediency, it suffers
more because of the policies of protectionism. In a free trade system,
trading patterns are not static over time, since adjustments are made to
accommodate the shifts in comparative advantages among nations.' 2
Shifts in international trading patterns produce shifts in domestic in-
come distribution patterns, and therein lies the basis for protectionist
politics. 10 3 Protection biased forces, composed of domestic producers
in actual, or potential, competition against foreign producers and the re-
gions, communities, domestic suppliers, and employees to whom such
domestic producers are economically vital, want their economic inter-
ests to be protected.' 0 4  Moreover, in the United States, organized
labor has become a powerful opponent of free trade, as shifts in trading
patterns export unionized jobs and provide domestic workers with the
incentive to seek jobs in the non-unionized service sector.'05 On the
other side of the debate are the trade biased forces, composed of three
broad interest groups: (1) the export-oriented producers and the re-
gions, communities, suppliers and employees to whom they are impor-
tant; (2) the import-oriented groups including importers, distributors,
§ 2402, by deleting the word "abnormal" before the words "foreign demand". In de-
leting the word "abnormal" from this provision, Congress has made it lawful to impose
export controls whenever the operation of supply and demand cause a product's domestic
price to rise, even though foreign demand remains constant or does not increase exces-
sively. The consequences of any action the United States takes under this section will
be to make the United States a less reliable trading partner, invite retaliations, and raise
moral questions if food or fertilizer is involved. See note, The Export Administration
Amendments of 1974, 7 LAw & POL. INT'L Bus. 925, 935-38 (1975).
101. See note 24 supra.
102. See SAMUJELSON, supra note 2, at 645-68.
103. See H. KANAmOBI, G. FELS, E. FRIED, et al., WORLD TRADE AND DOMESTIC AD-
JuSTMENT 5 (1973) (A tripartite report to the Brookings Institute by fourteen econo-
mists from Japan, the European Community, and North America) [hereinafter cited as
WORLD TRADE ADJUSTMENT]; Bale, Adjustment Assistance Under the Trade Expansion
Act of 1962, 9 J. INT'L LAw & EcoN. 49 & n.4 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Bale Ad-
justment]; Note, The Politics of Free Trade: The Role of Trade Adjustment Systems,
14 VA. J. INT'L L. 151, 153-55 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Free Trade Politics].
104. Waiter, How Trade Policy is Made: A Politico-Economic Decision System, in
Tm UNITED STATES NTERNATIONAL MARKETS-CoMMERCIAL POLICY OPTIONS IN AN
AGE OF CONTRoLS 17, 23, 26-27 (R. Hawkins & I. Walter, eds. 1972) [hereinafter cited
as Walter Trade Policy Systems].
105. Johnson, Broad Trade Strategy for the Seventies, in TRADE STRATEGY FOR RICH
AND POOR NATIONS 1, 5 (H. Johnson ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Johnson Seventies
Strategy]. See MALMGREN PEACEKEEPING, supra note 11, at 160-62; MALMGREN TRADE,
supra note 27, at 29-30; Hesburgh Introduction, supra note 12, at 9; Walter Trade Policy
Systems, supra note 104, at 28.
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retailers and consumers; and (3) businesses, financial institutions and
individuals having substantial foreign investments, which may be jeop-
ardized by domestic investment controls or foreign measures designed
to retaliate against domestic protectionist activities. 1°6 The export-
oriented groups are concerned with access to foreign markets and the do-
mestic availability and prices of imported articles used in the production
of exported articles. 10 7  The import-oriented groups are concerned
with sales volumes, costs, prices and product choices.' 0 8
The debate is tilted in favor of the protection biased forces. First,
the protection biased forces usually can demonstrate immediate and di-
rect losses, or the threat thereof, resulting from import competition,
whereas the trade biased sector usually is limited to pointing to some
potential gain which may be foregone in the absence of free trade.10
Often, trade biased forces are not aware of the losses they suffer be-
cause of protectionism, and thus fail to mobilize. 1 0 Second, organized
labor is a much more effective political force than are consumers. This
is because consumers are not organized, have protectionist interests,
have difficulty in perceiving their losses attributable to protectionism,
and are not easily aggravated by marginal losses when the economy is
going well."' Finally, protection biased forces can achieve their objec-
tives through governmental activity which is not in the limelight, while
trade liberalization actions cannot occur without the full political proc-
ess operating."12
106. Walter Trade Policy Systems, supra note 104, at 28-29.
107. Id. at 28.
108. Id. at 29.
109. Id. at 28, 31.
110. Id. at 31.
111. Id. at 29, 30. See MALMGREN PEACEKEEPIno, supra note 11, at 84.
112. Walter Trade Policy Systems, supra note 104, at 35. In this connection it is
useful to compare the process prescribed by the Trade Act of 1974 for negotiating reduc-
tions of nontariff barriers to those the Act prescribes for granting domestic industries
relief from injury caused by import competition. Not only must any agreement reducing
nontariff barriers be approved by both houses of Congress, Trade Act of 1974, § 102(e),
19 U.S.C. § 2112(e) (Supp. IV 1974), but before the President may make an offer
in connection with any nontariff barrier agreement he must solicit advice from the
United States International Trade Commission, Trade Act of 1974, § 131, 19 U.S.C.
§ 2151 (Supp. IV 1974), all relevant executive departments, including the Departments
of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Interior, Labor, State, and Treasury, Trade Act of
1974, § 132, 19 U.S.C. § 2152 (Supp. IV 1974), and representative elements from the
private sector, including representatives of government, labor, industry, agriculture,
small business, service industries, retailers, consumer interests, and the general public.
Trade Act of 1974, § 135, 19 U.S.C. § 2155(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1974). In addition,
public hearings must be held to afford any interested person the opportunity to present
his views concerning proposed trade agreements. Trade Act of 1974, § 133, 19 U.S.C.
§ 2153 (Supp. IV 1974). In contrast, industries seeking import injury relief petition
[Vol. 12:1
22
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 12 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol12/iss1/1
NONTARIFF TRADE BARRIERS
It is a tribute to the political power of the protectionist forces that
a body of trade law has developed which, in essence, gives nations the
right to erect trade barriers to protect their domestic industries from
the natural operation of the doctrine of comparative advantage. This
body of law originated from the desire of trading nations to reduce pro-
tectionist opposition to trade liberalization agreements. An "escape
clause" procedure allows nations temporarily to suspend trade agree-
ment obligations for such time as is necessary to prevent or eliminate
injuries to their economies which occur "as a result of unforeseen de-
velopments and of the effect of the obligations [they have] incurred
... M11 In the 1950's, Japan and less-developed countries were
dramatically successful in expanding their exports. This expansion was
so large, and occurred so quickly, that massive economic dislocations
developed within the recipient countries. In response, recipient coun-
tries began erecting blatantly discriminatory trade barriers against so-
called low-wage imports in violation of the doctrine of comparative ad-
vantage and the law of GATr.1 4 In response to a United States ini-
tiative aimed at blunting this protectionist surge, GATT took up the
issue of how market disruption can be avoided in a manner consistent
with continued trade liberalization. GATT set up a working party to
study this issue, but all that was accomplished was a determination that
GATT safeguards, such as the "escape clause" provision, were not ade-
quate devices for avoiding market disruption,115 and the formulation
of a description of market disruption as:
[s]ituations [which] generally contain the following elements
in combination:
(i) A sharp and substantial increase or potential increase of
imports of particular products from particular sources;
(ii) these products are offered at prices which are substan-
tially below those prevailing for similar goods of com-
parable quality in the market of the importing country;
the United States International Trade Commission, which then determines if relief
should be granted within the context of administrative agency proceedings. Trade Act
of 1974, § 201, 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (Supp. IV 1974). Affirmative Trade Commission
determinations are forwarded to the President for approval. Trade Act of 1974, § 202,
19 U.S.C. § 2251(d) (Supp. IV 1974). If the President's actions differ from that rec-
ommended by the Trade Commission, the Trade Commission recommendations shall
go into effect if both houses of Congress pass resolutions rejecting the President's pro-
posed actions. Trade Act of 1974, § 203, 19 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (1) (Supp. IV 1974).
113. GATI, art. XIX. See Dxumr GATr, supra note 26, at 99.
114. See DAIms GATr, supra note 26, at 297.
115. Id. at 298-99.
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(iii) there is serious damage to domestic producers or the
threat thereof;
(iv) the price differentials referred to in paragraph (ii) above
do not arise from governmental intervention in the
fixing or formation of prices or from dumping practices.
In some situations other elements are also present and the
enumeration above is not, therefore, intended as an exhaus-
tive definition of market disruption."'
It is significant that this description does not refer to-reasons why
a country suddenly experiences a substantial influx of imports into its
domestic markets, thus bypassing GATT's "escape clause" requirement
that import injuries result from the effects of trade liberalization agree-
ments and unforeseen developments."' This description also implies
that there are situations which justify a nation taking action to negate
temporarily another nation's comparative advantages with respect to a
particular product. Such action was soon forthcoming in the guise of
achieving orderly adjustments to the expansion of international trade.
Developing nations historically have begun their industrialization
process by building domestic textile industries. 1 8 At the start of the
1960's, the textile industries of most developed countries were facing
severe import competition from the textile industries of Japan and less-
developed countries."19 Since textile industries occupied economically
significant positions within the developed countries, a movement arose
for the creation of an international arrangement for the orderly devel-
opment of the cotton textile trade. 20  The arrangement was called the
Long-Term Arrangements Regarding International Trade in Cotton
Textiles (LTA).' 2 ' The objective of the LTA was to give developed
countries a five-year breathing space within which to wind down their
textile industries, so that the less-developed countries could eventually
fully exercise their comparative advantages in this field.' 22 This ration-
alization of the cotton textile industry was to be brought about by re-
116. Id.
117. GATr, art. XIX, para. 1(a).
118. This phenomenon arises from the fact that textile industries are labor inten-
sive, have modest capital requirements, involve easily imparted job skills, and possess
no important economies of scale. H. KANAMUwR, G. Fns.s, E. FRIED ET AL, WoRLD
TP.ADE AND DOMESTIC ADJUSTMENT 7 (1973).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Long-Term Arrangements Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles,
done Feb. 9, 1962, [1962] 3 U.S.T. 2672, T.I.A.S. No. 5240, 471 U.N.T.S. 296 (en-
tered into force for the United States on October 1, 1962) [hereinafter cited as L.T.A.].
122. L.T.A., Preamble, [1962] 3 U.S.T. 2672; L.T.A., art. 14, [1962] 3 U.S.T. 2679.
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quiring importing nations to reduce in stages any barriers which were
directed against cotton imports at the outset of the LTA. 23  New bar-
riers could be imposed only in cases where cotton imports threatened
to disrupt a country's domestic market.'2 4  Market disruption barriers
were not to reduce the imports of any nation below the level attained
during a twelve-month period, ending three months prior to the date
the importing country requested consultation with the exporting coun-
try concerning the situation.' 25  These barriers were to be effective
only long enough to remedy the offending market disruption 28 and,
in any case, were to be relaxed by a five percent quota increase every
twelve months of their existence..2 7
The LTA did not bring about the demise of inefficient cotton tex-
tile industries in developed countries. Instead, the LTA was extended
twice for a total life of eleven years.2 " This was attributable to the
myriad of new barriers imposed on cotton imports in the name of mar-
ket disruption, as interpretations of what constitutes market disruption
became increasingly liberal, to the point that any increase in a country's
exports was considered disruptive. 29 Today the LTA has been ex-
panded into a textile agreement covering wools and man-made fibers,
as well as cotton textiles. 3° Thus, it appears that the LTA has been
converted from a temporary procedure for rational adjustment in the
international trade of cotton textiles into a permanent protectionist de-
vice to guarantee inefficient domestic textile industries a share of their
countries' markets.
123. L.T.A., art. 2, [1962] 3 U.S.T. 2674. In connection with their Article 2 obli-
gations, Austria, Denmark, the European Economic Community, Norway, and Sweden
agreed to expand their markets to cotton textile imports at the end of the 5 year period
by 95%, 15%, 88%, 15% and 15% respectively. L.T.A. annex A, [1962] 3 U.S.T.
2680.
124. L.T.A., art. 2, para. 2, and art. 3, para. 1, [1962] 3 U.S.T. 2674-75.
125. L.T.A., annex B, para. I(a), [1962] 3 U.S.T. 2680.
126. L.T.A., art. 3, para. 6, [1962] 3 U.S.T. 2676.
127. L.T.A., annex B, para. 2, [1962] 3 U.S.T. 2681. In exceptional cases the five
percent figure could be departed from within a range of 0 to 5 percent in light of the
importing country's market conditions and other relevant factors if the concerned export-
ing country was consulted beforehand. Id.
128. Protocol Extending the Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Cotton
Textiles of 1 October 1962, May 1, 1967, [1967] 2 U.S.T. 1337, T.I.A.S. No. 6289
(entered into force Oct. 1, 1967); Protocol Extending the Arrangement Regarding In-
ternational Trade in Cotton Textiles of 1 Oct. 1962, done June 15, 1970, [1970] 2 U.S.T.
1970, T.I.A.S. No. 6940 (entered into force October 1, 1970).
129. See DAm GAT', supra note 26, at 303-08.
130. Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles, done Dec. 20, 1973,
[1974] 1 U.S.T. 1001, T.I.A.S. No. 7840 (entered into force except for art. 2, paras. 2,
3 and 4, Jan. 1, 1974, and entered into force with respect to art. 2, paras. 2, 3 and 4
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The liberalization of the definition of market disruption has been
reflected in the "escape clause" provisions of the United States Trade
Act of 1974.131 Previous United States "escape clause" provisions au-
thorized impositions of quotas when: (1) an article is imported in in-
creased quantities; (2) the increase is attributable in major part to
trade concessions; (3) a domestic industry producing comparable arti-
cles is seriously damaged or threatened with serious damage; and (4)
the increase in imports is the major factor causing, or threatening to
cause, serious injury.132  Under these tests, only a small minority of
petitioning industries were granted import relief.'88 The Trade Act
of 1974 has lessened the "escape clause" requirements. No longer
must petitioners demonstrate a link between a trade concession and the
offending increases of imports.'84 An even more liberal modification
was made to the injury causation test. Now petitioners must establish
that the increase in imports is a substantial factor, rather than the major
factor, in causing, or threatening to cause, serious injuries to their in-
dustries.' 35  In applying these new tests, the Trade Commission has
recommended that import relief be granted six times during the first
half of 1976.13 The Trade Commission has granted import relief even
April 1, 1974) [hereinafter cited as the I.T.A.]. Except for its expanded scope this
arrangement is nearly identical to the L.T.A. and is to remain in force for 4 years.
LT.A., art. 16, [1974] 1 U.S.T. 1016.
131. Trade Act of 1974, § 201-03, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (Supp. IV 1974).
132. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 301(b), 76 Stat. 884
[hereinafter cited as Trade Expansion Act of 1962].
133. From May, 1962 until January, 1970 the United States Tariff Commission ruled
on 16 escape clause petitions, denying 13, approving 1, and evenly dividing on 2. HousE
COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 91ST CONG., 2D SESS., SELECTED PROVISIONS OF THE TAR-
IFF AND TRADE LAws OF THE UNITED STATES AND RELATED MATERIALS 75 (Comm. Print
1970) [hereinafter cited as SELCrD PROVIIONS]. See 7 LAW & POL. INT'L Bus. 459,
459-60 (1975).
134. The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 required that market disruption arise "as
a result in major part of concessions granted under trade agreements .... " Trade
Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, § 301(b), 76 Stat. 884 (emphasis added).
This language is not included in § 201(b) of the Trade Act of 1974, § 201(b), 19
U.S.C. § 2251(b) (Supp. IV 1974).
135. Compare § 301(b)(1) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-
794, § 301(b)(1), 76 Stat. 884, with § 201(b)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974. This
change means that under the Trade Act of 1974 an "escape clause" petition will be
valid even though injury to a domestic industry was caused as much by another factor
as by an increase of imports. Trade Act of 1974, § 201(b)(1), (4), 19 U.S.C. § 2251
(b)(1), (4) (Supp. IV 1974).
136. Stainless Steel, Alloy Tool Steel, and'Silicon Electrical Steel, TA-201-5, 41 Fed.
Reg. 3786 (1976); Footwear, TA-201-7, 41 Fed. Reg. 8432 (1976); Stainless Steel Table
Flatware, TA-201-8, 41 Fed. Reg. 9628 (1976); Mushrooms, TA-201-10, 41 Fed. Reg.
12358 (1976); Ferrocyanide and Ferrocyanide Blue Pigments, TA-201-11, 41 Fed. Reg.
15069 (1976); and Shrimp, TA-201-12, 41 Fed. Reg. 20224 (1976). However, during
the last half of 1976 the Trade Commission recommended the imposition of import
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though imports have not increased absolutely or relatively vis-a-vis do-
mestic production, 137 and even though other factors injured the peti-
tioning industry as much, if not more, than did import competition. 188
Should the President uphold these rulings, the United States "escape
clause" mechanism will cease to be a device for aiding inefficient do-
mestic industries in adjusting gracefully to changing patterns in world
trade, and instead will become a method by which domestic industries
can impose unwarranted restrictions on imports.189
Perhaps the most trade-restrictive development of the market dis-
ruption controversy is acceptance of the use of voluntary export re-
straints as a valid market disruption remedy. This practice was started
by Japan as a means of preventing importing countries from imposing
restraints on its imports. 4 ' The rationale behind this action is that,
once implemented, import restrictions tend to become permanent trade
barriers because they stimulate the formation of vested interest groups
which lobby for their retention.14' Therefore, by its use of voluntary
export restraints, Japan hoped to prevent the erection of permanent
quotas in only one instance; Honey, TA-201-14, 41 Fed. Reg. 27786 (1976). The
President promptly rejected the Trade Commission's recommendation. Memorandum
from Gerald R. Ford to Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, August 28, 1976,
41 Fed. Reg. 36787.
137. Memorandum from Gerald R. Ford to Special Representative for Trade Negoti-
ations, May 31, 1976, 41 Fed. Reg. 22331 (Determination Under Section 202(a) of
the Trade Act; Iron Blue Pigment).
138. The Trade Commission's finding that the "specialty" steel (stainless steel, alloy
tool steel, and silicon electrical steel) has been import injured has been severely criti-
cized by those who feel that the "specialty" steel industry's woes are almost entirely
attributable to a decrease in domestic demand resulting from the current economic reces-
sion. See Bergsten Trade War, supra note 14, at 31; N.Y. Times, June 14, 1976, §
L, at 30, col. 1; N.Y. Times, June 16, 1976, § A, at 20, col. 4.
139. So far the President has imposed import quotas only in the case of specialty
steel. Presidential Proel. 4445, June 11, 1976, 41 Fed. Reg. 24101 (Temporary Quanti-
tative Limitation on the Importation into the United States of Certain Articles of Stain-
less Steel or Alloy Tool Steel). In four cases the President has recommended that ad-
justment assistance be given the import injured industry in lieu of imposing import quo-
tas. Memorandum from Gerald R. Ford to Special Representative for Trade Negotia-
tions, April 16, 1976, 41 Fed. Reg. 16545 (Footwear); Memorandum from Gerald R.
Ford to Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, April 30, 1976, 41 Fed. Reg.
18403 (Stainless Steel Flatware); Letter from Gerald R. Ford to the Secretary of Labor,
May 13, 1976, 41 Fed. Reg. 20151 (Mushrooms); Letter from Gerald R. Ford to Sec-
retary of Labor, July 1, 1976, 41 Fed. Reg. 27709 (Shrimp); Letter from Gerald R.
Ford to Secretary of Commerce, July 1, 1976, 41 Fed. Reg. 27711 (Shrimp). In one
case the President determined that no relief should be granted. See note 137 supra,
(Iron Blue Pigment).
140. See DAM GAIT, supra note 26, at 299; MALMGpmN PEAcEKEEPING, supra note
11, at 43.
141. See Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136,
138 (D.C. Cir. 1974); B~ADwiN NTB's, supra 22, at 43.
27
Allison: The Nontariff Trade Barrier Challenge: Development and Distortion
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2013
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
trade barriers against its products. However, the use of voluntary ex-
port restraints has spawned the notion that domestic producers are en-
titled to a "fair share" of their country's markets, even though foreign
producers are more efficient. 142 Furthermore, even though voluntary
export restraints are as restrictive as quantitative import restrictions in
their impact on world trade, their use is not regulated by the law of
GATT.143  As a result, the number of voluntary export restraints has
mushroomed in the forms of government-to-government bilateral
agreements and intra-industry market sharing arrangements. 44 This
trend further damages worldwide trade relations because it encourages
nations to enter into discriminatory trade arrangements outside of
GATT's multilateral consultative framework.
Policing
Protectionism can serve a useful policing function, insuring that
importers do not use NTB's to gain artificial advantages within the do-
mestic markets of importing countries. For example, GATT author-
izes importing countries to apply extra import duties on the products
of foreign producers who are either engaging in dumping (antidumping
duties) or receiving subsidies (countervailing duties) . 4r But these
policing.procedures become purely protectionist devices to the extent
that they do more than just eliminate the artificial advantages of the
offending imports. The United States has been charged with adminis-
tering its antidumping and countervailing laws in a protective fashion.
Criticism of the United States' antidumping policy stems from its
failure to fully implement the International Antidumping Code, a mul-
142. See Hawkins & Walter Trends, supra note 83, at 8.
143. Although voluntary export restraints violate GATTs ban on the use of quanti-
tative restrictions, GATT, art. XI, para. 1, there has been little effective enforcement
of GATT's export control policy. See JACKSON WORLD TRADE, supra note 34, § 19.2,
at 502 and n.29. There are practical reasons why this ban on quantitative restrictions
has not been enforced. First, producing nations will not complain since they are the
contracting parties which either have imposed the restraints or have sought the erection
of the restraints in order to insulate their domestic producers from import competition.
Second, the consuming nations do not have the incentive to complain because they en-
joy lower prices for the restricted product since the supply of the restricted product
in their markets is increased by the quantity of the restricted product which the export
restraints prevent from being exported to producer nations. Finally, intra-industry mar-
ket sharing agreements are beyond the jurisdiction of GAT since GAT applies only
to the official government activities of its Contracting Parties.
144. See Hawkins & Walter Trends, supra note 83, at 8.
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tilateral agreement on the implementation of GATT's Article VI.146
The United States subscribed to the Code in an executive agree-
ment,147but Congress refused to pass the legislation necessary for the
United States' complete adoption of the Code. Instead, the United
States has adopted the Code only to the extent that it is consistent with
United States' antidumping policies, as formulated through enforce-
ment of the Antidumping Act of 1921.148 Critics allege that inconsist-
encies between the antidumping enforcement procedures followed by
the United States under the Act and those prescribed by the Code sub-
ject producers charged with dumping in the United States to undue
delays and expense. 149  A major criticism concerns the fact that the
146. Agreement on Implementation of art. VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, June 30, 1967, [1968] 4 U.S.T. 4348, T.I.A.S. No. 6431. (Effective July 1,
1968) [hereinafter cited as I.A.C.].
147. Id.
148. Act of Oct. 24, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-634, § 201, 82 Stat. 1347. This Act
directed the United States Tariff Commission to
(1) resolve any conflict between the International Antidumping Code and the
Antidumping Act [of] 1921 [§§ 201-202, 19 U.S.C. § 160 (1970)], in favor of
the Act as applied by the agency administering the Act, and (2) take into
account the provisions of the International Antidumping Code only insofar as
they are consistent with the Antidumping Act, 1921, as applied by the agency
administering the Act ....
149. The I.A.C. requires that there be a simultaneous determination of sales at less
than fair value and material injury during an antidumping investigation. I.A.C., art.
5(b). In contrast, the Antidumping Act of 1921 mandates a bifurcated antidumping
investigation wherein the Secretary of Treasury is to determine if sales of less than
fair trade value have occurred and the United States International Trade Commission
is to determine whether a domestic industry has been injured. Antidumping Act of
1921, § 201, 19 U.S.C. § 160 as amended by the Trade Act of 1974, § 321(a), 19 U.S.C.
§ 160. This bifurcated process not only delays the termination of antidumping investi-
gations, see Comment, The Administration by the Department of the Treasury of the
Laws Authorizing the Imposition of Antidumping Duties, 14 VA. J. IN''L L. 463, 476-
77 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Administration of Antidumping Duties], but also costs
the accused importers money before there is a determination of injury, since the Anti-
dumping Act authorizes the Treasury Secretary to withhold appraisal of the accused
importers' products pending the final outcome of the investigation. Such withholding
prevents the accused importers from introducing their products into United States mar-
kets. The Trade Act of 1974, § 321(a) (2), 19 U.S.C. § 160(b) (Supp. IV 1974);
see Administration of Antidumping Duties, supra, at 478-79.
The I.A.C. prohibits the retroactive assessment of antidumping duties unless the
alleged dumping actually produces a material injury. I.A.C., art. 11, paras. (i) and
(iii). Under the Antidumping Act of 1921 antidumping duties may be assessed retro-
actively to the effective date of the Treasury Secretary's withholding of appraisement
order, even if the investigation reveals that the dumping only threatens a material injury
to a domestic industry. Timken Co. v. Simon, Civ. No. 75-0180 (D.D.C. Feb. 19,
1975).
As to the question of provisional measures, the I.A.C. does not perfit withholding
of appraisement orders to be issued unless a preliminary finding of dumping has been
made and there is sufficient evidence of injury. I.A.C., art. 10(a). This conflicts with
the Treasury Department's right under the Antidumping Act of 1921 to issue withhold-
ing of appraisement orders upon finding sales at less than fair value. Trade Act of
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Code attaches greater importance to the petitioning industry's alleged
injuries than does the United States. In order to secure the desired
relief, the petitioning industry must show a greater injury and a stronger
causal connection between its injury and the dumping under the Code
than under the Act.150 Moreover, the Code allows antidumping duties
to be assessed only to the extent necessary to eliminate the domestic
industry's injuries,151 while the Act requires the antidumping duty to
equal the entire difference between the dumped product's fair value
and its selling price in the United States.' 2 As a consequence, critics
claim that the United States' antidumping policy overprotects its domes-
tic industries.
The fact that the United States' antidumping policy has less-
restrictive injury requirements than does the Code may be attributable
to the Act's antitrust origins.-" The primary emphasis of the United
States' antitrust policy is toward eliminating business practices which
1974, § 321(a) (2), 19 U.S.C. § 160 (Supp. IV 1970). While the Treasury Secretary
can refer a case to the United States International Trade Commission for a preliminary
determination of the injury element, it is purely discretionary with the Secretary as to
whether to make such a referral. Trade Act of 1974, § 321(a)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 160
(Supp. IV 1974); See Malmgren & Marks Negotiating, supra note 11, at 380.
150. Under the I.A.C. "A determination of injury shall be made only when the au-
thorities concerned are satisfied that the dumped imports are demonstrably the principal
cause of material injury. . to a domestic industry. .. .. I.A.C., Art. 3(a) (empha-
sis added). In contrast, under the Antidumping Act of 1921 the injury need only be
more than de minimis. Elemental Sulfur from Mexico, AA 1921-92, 37 Fed. Reg. 9417
(U.S.I.T.C. 1972); Cast Iron Soil Pipe from Poland, AA 1921-50, 32 Fed. Reg. 12925,
12926 (U.S.LT.C. 1967); see SnNATE Comm. ON FINANCE, 90TH CONG. 2D SnSS., RE-
PORT OF THE U.S. TARIFF ComassioN ON S. CON. Ras. 38, REGARDiNo THE INTERNA-
TiONAL ANTIDUMPING CODE SIONED AT GENEVA ON JUNE 30, 1967, 11-12 (Comm. Print
1968); Comment, The Antidumping Act of 1921: Primary Lead Metal and the Injury
Standard, 10 TEx. INV'L LJ. 357, 363-73 (1975) (suggesting that the de minimis injury
standard was applied by the U.S.I.T.C. in its finding of injury in Primary Lead Metal
from Australia and Canada, AA 1921-134-35, 39 Fed. Reg. 2156 (1974) so as to border
on creating a per se violation standard with respect to antidumping actions) [hereinafter
cited as Primary Lead Metal]; but see Malmgren & Marks Negotiating, supra note 11,
at 377 n.205 (stating that the de minimis injury standard has not been used in an injury
determination since Elemental Sulfur from Mexico, supra note 150), and the dumped
imports need not be the principal cause, the major cause, or even a substantial cause
of injury to a domestic industry, but must be merely an identifiable cause of such injury.
Water Circulating Pumps from the United Kingdom, AA 1921-152, 41 Fed. Reg. 22635,
22637 (U.S.I.T.C. 1976).
151. I.A.C., art. 8(a), which states in relevant part that "[lt is desirable that the im-
position [of an antidumping duty] be permissive... and that the duty be less than the
margin [of dumping], if such lesser duty would be adequate to remove the injury to the
domestic industry."
152. Antidumping Act of 1921, § 202.
153. See B. Epstein, The Illusory Conflict Between Antidumping and Antitrust, 18
ANrrrusr BuLL. 1 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Epstein Illusory Conflict]; Primary
Lead Metal, supra note 150, at 358-60.
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are injurious to competition.1' 4 The United States considers it anti-
competitive for a producer to engage in price discrimination when its
lower price cannot be justified by its cost structure or by existing com-
petitive conditions. 55 Such price discrimination is especially anticom-
petitive when a producer supports a lower price in one market by high
profits accumulated in another market in which it enjoys some degree
of monopoly power.156 In international trade, almost invariably a pro-
ducer is able to charge less for its products abroad than it does at home
only when it enjoys some degree of monopoly power at home.1 7  Since
the business practices which enable a foreign producer to gain monop-
oly power within its home markets are not readily subject to United
States antitrust laws, 5 8 the United States negates any dumping which
minimally injures a domestic industry. By doing so, the United States
affords some protection to its industries from the exercise of monopoly
power which other countries have allowed to develop.
154. See Sherman Act §§ 1-2, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (Supp. IV 1974); Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. § 12 (1970). In the recent case of Gordon v. New York Stock Ex-
change, Inc., 422 U.S. 659 (1975) holding that the system of fixed commission rates
under the supervision of the Securities Exchange Commission is beyond the reach of
the antitrust laws, Mr. Justice Blackmun's opinion states that "the sole aim of antitrust
legislation is to protect competition .... ." Id. at 689.
155. The Robinson-Patman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1970).
156. See McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J. Lw
& EcoN. 137 (1958).
157. See Epstein Illusory Conflict, supra note 153, at 7, 18.
158. Foreign defendants may be reached under the antitrust laws of the United
States when they commit anticompetitive acts abroad with the intent of affecting imports
into the United States and the imports are affected by the anticompetitive acts. United
States v. Aluminum Company of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); See United
States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 1963 CCH Trade Cas.
70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). However, the United States antitrust laws rarely reach this
situation because of the lack of jurisdiction over the parties, see United States v. DeBeers
Consolidated Mines, Ltd., 1948 CCH Trade Cas. 62,248 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (holding
that occasional sales of its products within the United States did not subject a foreign
corporation to the jurisdiction of the United States courts); K. BRnwsTER, JR., ANi-
TRUST AND AMmUCAN BusmnEss ABROAD 54-63 (1958). When the government wishes
to avoid embarrassing foreign affairs conflicts with other nations it treats such matters
as political problems rather than legal problems. See United States v. The Watchmakers
of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 1965 CCH Trade Cas. 71,352 (S.D.N.Y.
1965), modifying, 1963 CCH Trade Cas. 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (The previous judg-
ment was modified to remove any conflicts with the decree and the exercise of sover-
eignty by the Swiss Confederation upon the request of the defendants and advice from
the State Department that such action would be advantageous from the standpoint of
American foreign policy). Furthermore, anticompetitive behavior which is mandated
by a foreign government is shielded from the United States antitrust laws by the act
of state doctrine, on the basis that the executive branch is more competent than the
judicial branch to pass upon the acts of a foreign government. Occidental Petroleum
Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd per curiam,
461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972).
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In contrast, the Code originated within GATT's legal framework,
which is designed to promote higher world real income levels by pro-
viding internationally traded goods with the broadest access to interna-
tional markets consistent with efficient and fair allocation of the world's
productive resources. 159 Price discrimination is not inconsistent with
GAIT goals when it facilitates the opening of new markets through
necessary promotional pricing.160 Furthermore, price discrimination
can lead to permanently lower prices by stimulating firms to become
more efficient so that their products will be competitive with the price
discriminating producer's products.' 61 In proscribing the assessment of
antidumping duties, unless dumping is the principal cause of a domestic
industry's injuries, 62 and by restricting the permitted antidumping duty
to that which remedies those injuries attributable to dumping,0 0 the
Code is more sensitive to the foregoing considerations, and more con-
ducive to free trade, than is the United States' antidumping policy
under the Act.
The lack of an injury requirement is also the focus of criticism
against the United States' countervailing policy. The United States'
countervailing laws require that imports which benefit from any direct
or indirect bounty or grant be assessed a duty equal in amount with
the offending bounty or grant, 6 4 unless this assessment would jeop-
ardize the outcome of negotiations leading to "internationally agreed
rules and procedures governing the use of subsidies (and other export
incentives) and the application of countervailing duties."'' 5  In deter-
mining whether to countervail a particular subsidy, the Secretary of the
Treasury is to consider whether the subsidy injured a domestic industry
only if the United States is bound to do so under an international agree-
ment and the offending imports are classified as duty-free.106 From
an antitrust perspective, this lack of an injury requirement is more jus-
tified in the countervailing context than is the weak injury requirement
of the United States' antidumping policy. Certainly, a producer receiv-
ing governmental aid is more able to engage in uncompetitive pricing
159. See GATr, Preamble, 61 Stat. pts. 5, 6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700.
160. See note 32 supra.
161. See note 33 supra.
162. LA.C., art. 3(a).
163. LA.C., art. 8(a).
164. Tariff Act of 1930, § 303(a)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 1303, as amended by Trade Act
of 1974, § 331(a), 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (Supp. IV 1974).
165. Tariff Act of 1930, § 303(d), 19 U.S.C. § 1303(d)(1) (Supp. IV 1974).
166. Tariff Act of 1930, § 303(a) (2), 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a) (2) (Supp. IV 1974).
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and marketing activities than one relying on its own financial resources.
Nevertheless, the United States' treatment of countervailing subsidies,
as if they were illegal per se, is unnecessarily protective when applied
to subsidies which are granted for development purposes. Many less-
developed countries have a shortage of private capital, making indus-
trial development nearly impossible without government financial
aid.' Often the markets of less-developed countries are too small
to accommodate the growth their industries must undergo to achieve
economies of scale. 6" Industries can remedy this condition only by
expanding into international trade. Developing export markets is a
risky and expensive process which many producers cannot undertake
without government export subsidies.169 Many governments pursue
regional economic development programs in order to bring jobs to eco-
nomically deprived areas of their countries.170 To encourage producers
to locate in these areas, subsidies are offered producers to defray addi-
tional expenses they incur by participating in the development pro-
gram.17 ' Since these subsidies are merely compensatory, they are not
translatable into trade distorting prices and should not be countervailed.
Economic Development
As indicated above, the temporary use of NTB's is justified if, in
the long run, it facilitates an improvement in the world's real income
position. The infant industry theory of protection is such a justifica-
tion. Advocates of this theory feel that industries which are not com-
petitive, because they have yet to reach maturity or economies of scale,
should be protected from import competition.7 2  These advocates as-
sume that such industries will be self-sufficient, at least within their
home markets, and no longer need protection upon reaching maturity
and achieving economies of scale.'17  Less-developed countries argue
that if they are allowed to protect their industries from import compe-
tition without suffering retaliation at the hands of aggrieved developed
country competitors, they eventually will be able to develop the indus-
167. See VERnrr TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 31, at 150.
168. See MALMGREN TRADE, supra note 27, at 57; VERBrr TRADE AGREEmENTS, supra
note 31, at 11.
169. See Baldwin Non-Tariff Distortions, supra note 8, at 647.
170. See BAI.DwiN NTB's, supra note 22, at 120-21.
171. Id. at 127-28.
172. HARROD ECONOMICS, supra note 2, at 44-49; KENEN ECONOMCS, supra note 2,
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trial infrastructure and the supplies of capital, skilled labor and mana-
gerial talent that are needed to make their industries competitive.1 7 4
Although the infant industry theory seems sound, in practice it is
very difficult to implement properly. The first problem the imple-
menting country encounters is selecting the industries to be protected.
In some industries, firms must achieve significant economies of scale
to be competitive.175 The domestic markets of many less-developed
countries are too small to accommodate the growth a firm must undergo
to attain the necessary economies of scale?'16  Since the prices of the
protected products are greater than those of the excluded imports, a
less-developed country must exercise care in selecting protected indus-
tries to avoid burdening its economy with an oppressively high internal
cost structure. Such an economy would retard the development of
competitive export industries since these industries would have to pur-
chase high-cost inputs from protected domestic companies.1 77 Another
problem is that industries which are protected from competition tend
to remain permanently inefficient.178 Less-developed countries facing
the specter of complacent industries have to make the unpleasant
choice between continuing to endure costly inefficiencies or removing
the complacent industry's protection, thus risking the loss of one of
their few domestic industries.179 Finally, elimination of the protective
barriers erected in implementing the infant industry theory is very dif-
ficult. Vested interests form around protected industries, exerting po-
litical pressure on their governments to retain these trade barriers. No
one connected with a protected industry will admit that his industry ei-
ther has become self-sufficient and no longer needs support, or can
never become self-sufficient and no longer deserves support. 80
Recognizing the potential within the infant industry theory for pro-
moting the economic development of the less-developed nations,
GATT's Article XVIII, entitled "Governmental Assistance to Eco-
nomic Development," authorizes less-developed countries to employ
temporarily protective measures which are inconsistent with GATT ob-
174. See VER~rTRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 31, at 29.
175. Examples of industries requiring significant economies of scale include the auto-
motive, chemical fertilizer, paper and pulp, and steel industries. See WENTRAur PREF-
ERENcES, supra note 32, at 67.
176. Supra note 168; WEnTmAuB PREFERENCES, supra note 32, at 70.
177. See MALMGREN TRADE, supra note 27, at 34.
178. See WEmTRAB PREFERENCES, supra note 32, at 73.
179. See Vnnnrr TRADE AGREEMENTs, supra note 31, at 11.
180. See KENEN ECONOMICS, supra note 2, at 28; VERirr TRADE AoREEMENTS, supra
note 31, at 11.
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ligations, in order "to promote the establishment of a particular industry
with a view to raising the general standard of living of [their] people
... -" Recognizing the difficulties of properly administering an in-
fant industry development program, Article XVIII qualifies its infant
industry authority by approving its exercise only in cases where a devel-
opment program cannot otherwise succeed,182 subjecting its exercise to
annual review by the Contracting Parties,' and allowing countries ad-
versely affected by its exercise to seek compensation from the exercis-
ing country. 8 4 The review procedure insures that protective measures
are approved only as long as they are essential to the viability of a de-
velopment program which is progressing adequately. The compensa-
tion provisions insure that protective measures are not adopted unless
the development advantages accruing to the adopting country outweigh
the damages inflicted on others. Mindful of early decisions of the Con-
tracting Parties which proved that Article XVIII does not authorize
carte blanche impositions of restrictions, resentful of Article XVfI's re-
view procedures, and able to justify most of their protective measures on
grounds of balance of payments problems, the less-developed countries
rarely invoke Article XVIII to justify their development programs. 85
The Contracting Parties reacted to the development issues, which
were eloquently and forcefully brought to the world's attention during
the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), 88 by adding a fourth part to GAIT, entitled "Trade and
Development."' 8 7 Most of Part IV is concerned with promoting devel-
opment of less-developed countries by committing the developed coun-
tries to the reduction or elimination of trade barriers and governmental
programs which have detrimental impacts upon less-developed coun-
tries.'88 But Part IV is also significant to the discussion of NTB's be-
181. GAIT, art. XVIII, para. 13.
182. GATT, art. XVIII, paras. 13, 16.
183. GATT, art. XVIII, para. 6.
184. GATT, art. XVIII, paras. 18, 21.
185. See DAm GATT, supra note 26, at 228.
186. Id. at 237.
187. Protocol Amending the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to Introduce
a Part IV on Trade and Development, done Feb. 8, 1965, [1966] 2 U.S.T. 1977, T.I.A.S.
6139, 572 U.N.T.S. 320 (entered into force June 27, 1966).
188. See GATT, art. XXXVII, which commits the developed countries to reducing
and eliminating trade barriers affecting products of particular export interest to the less-
developed countries, to refraining from introducing or increasing trade barriers on prod-
ucts of particular export interest to the less-developed countries, and to refraining from
imposing and reducing or eliminating any fiscal policies which hamper the growth of
the consumption of primary products produced mainly in less-developed countries.
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cause it affirmatively encourages the Contracting Parties to "devise
measures designed to stabilize and improve the condition of world mar-
kets in [primary] products, including in particular measures designed
to attain stable, equitable, and remunerative prices . . . ." The
support for programs to stabilize the prices of primary products evolved
from the fact that the prices of primary products historically have been
prone to wild and sudden fluctuations because the demand for primary
products is relatively price inelastic.190  Since many less-developed
countries are dependent upon exporting a few primary products for the
bulk of their foreign exchange, fluctuations in the prices of primary
products produce parallel fluctuations in the foreign exchange levels
of these countries, making the economic stability, which is conducive
to steady economic development, an impossibility. 191 Despite the ap-
proval of the commodity agreement concept in Part IV, no commodities
agreement has been successfully implemented.192 Nevertheless, the
concept is still very much alive, and will result in the erection of new
NTB's should it come to fruition.1 93
Still another development concept of significance to a discussion
of NTB's is that of trade preferences for less-developed countries. The
preference concept was originally confined to a system of tariff prefer-
ences designed to encourage the development of viable manufacturing
industries within the less-developed countries.1 94 As the level of tariff
189. GATT, art. XXXVI, para. 4.
190. See JACKSON WORLD TRADE, supra note 34, § 27.1, at 717-20 (citing as one
example the 6 to 1 price ratio fluctuation of sugar and the 2 to 1 price ratio of cocoa,
coffee, oils and fats from 1961-65); Vmrr TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 31, at 84;
ERB SYsTMs, supra note 88, at 31; Wall Opportunities, supra note 35, at 32.
191. See JACKSON WORLD TRADE, supra note 34, § 27.1, at 719.
192. The major problem is to achieve agreement between the producers and consum-
ers. Producers want the commodities agreements to maintain permanently higher level
prices through the use of organized supply restraints. Conversely, the consumers, lead
by the United States, desire to stabilize commodity prices around a long-run market
price, thus giving a freer hand to market forces in determining the price. See PRiEo
BLOCS, supra note 7, at 166; North-South Dialogue, supra note 24, at 555.
193. New NTB's will arise from the need to impose some controls on supply in order
to stabilize prices. See PaRE BLOCS, supra note 7, at 166.
194. The model of the tariff preference is as follows: Country A protects a domestic
price of $100 with a customs duty of $25 on a product which has a world market price
of $80. Country B, a developing country, produces the product at $90, and therefore
cannot compete in country A's market unless it subsidizes its producers or receives (from
country A) a tariff preference over other world producers. If country A lowers its
customs duty to 10 on the products being produced in country B, country B will be
able to make sales in country A and may eventually achieve the economies of scale
necessary to reduce its production costs to the prevailing world market price of $80.
Once country B's producers become competitive, country A can remove its tariff prefer-
ence. See VERBrr TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 31, at 151-52.
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barriers has been reduced through multilateral trade negotiations, the
level of tariff preferences to the less-developed countries has declined,
thereby increasing the incentive to maintain trade preferences through
the use of NTB's.195 It is alleged that trade preferences create market
disruptions to which the developed countries overreact, and erect new
NTB's by resorting excessively to safeguard procedures. 196
Noneconomic Objectives
Economic welfare is just one component of over-all social welfare.
As governments become more active in promoting the social, political,
and environmental welfare of their countries, they create trade distor-
tions which are inconsistent with a free trade system. All nations, for
example, institute trade distortions in the interest of national security.
Export restrictions are imposed on items of strategic importance to
keep them beyond the reach of potential enemies.9 ' Uncompetitive,
inefficient domestic industries are supported so that adequate supplies
of strategic materials are available during times of war or international
economic upheavals.198
As a matter of social justice and political acumen, many nations
engage in income redistribution programs which involve the use of
195. Thus, continuing with our model, if country A negotiates a tariff reduction and
lowers its customs duty on the product from $25 to $15, country B's preference margin
is reduced from $15 to $5, which may make its products uncompetitive in country A's
markets. In fact, it has been alleged that tariff preferences systems may create barriers
to further tariff reductions as the preference givers may be unwilling to disadvantage
their favored trading partners by lowering the prevailing tariff rates. See WENrRAUB
PREFERENCES, supra note 32, at 130-31.
196. Id. at 123.
197, See Export Administration Amendments of 1974, § 9, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403
(h) (Supp. IV 1974), authorizing the President to disapprove of and prevent the ex-
portation of goods and technology having military significance to communist countries
as defined by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 § 620(f), 22 U.S.C. § 2370(f), amend-
ing 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (1961), upon receiving the recommendation from the Secretary
of Defense, who is authorized under this section to monitor all exports to Communist
countries to the extent that such export shipments are not in the interest of the United
States, defense posture. Such action falls under GATT's security exemptions. GATr,
art. XXI, paras. (a) & (b).
198. The United States has a legal provision entitling the President to restrict the
imports of any product which he and the Secretary of Treasury find is being imported
into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to impair the
national security. In making their determinations, the President and the Secretary of
Treasury are to "give consideration to domestic production needed for projected national
defense requirements, the capacity of domestic industries to meet such requirements
. . . [and] the requirements of growth of such industries . .. ." Trade Expansion
Act of 1962, § 232, 19 U.S.C. § 1862, as amended, Trade Act of 1974, § 127(d), 19
U.S.C. § 1862 (Supp. IV 1974).
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NTB's. Subsidies are used to enlist businesses in regional development
programs . 99 Desiring to avoid the social disruptions which accompany
massive rural-to-urban migrations, and responding to the intense politi-
cal pressures of those who do not wish to leave the farming community,
governments of most developed countries use NTB's to prevent further
deterioration in the income position of their agricultural sectors vis-a-
vis their industrial sectors.200
NTB's are used as weapons in the battleground of international
politics. Arab nations boycott firms which do business with Israel. For
humanitarian reasons, most members of the United Nations have im-
posed economic embargoes on Rhodesia and South Africa. In its
Trade Act of 1974, the United States reserved the right to withhold
most-favored-nation treatment, credit guarantees, and the benefits of
all its commercial agreements from countries which unduly restrict the
emigration rights of their citizens,22 1 or fail to cooperate with United
States' efforts to account for and recover all its military and civilian per-
sonnel missing in Southeast Asia.20 2
Currently, considerable attention is being given to the trade re-
stricting potential of product standards. Product standards are specifi-
cations dealing with quality, safety, performance, environmental com-
patibility and other product characteristics which nations require pro-
ducers to comply with before allowing the producers' goods, services,
199. See BALDwiN NTB's, supra note 22, at 120-21.
200. In the United States the President has the authority to limit imports of any
agricultural product which is being imported into the country in such quantities as
to interfere with any federal agricultural program. Agricultural Adjustment Act § 22,
Act of Aug. 24, 1935, ch. 641, § 31, 49 Stat. 773, as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 624 (1970).
At various times under the authority of § 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act the
United States has imposed import quotas on certain dairy products, cotton, certain cotton
wastes, and cotton products, wheat, wheat flour, peanuts, rye, rye flour, rye meal, barley,
barley malt, oats, ground oats, shelled filberts, tung nuts and tung oil. See SELEcrED
PROVISIONS, supra note 133, at 286-310.
The Common Market countries impose quantitative restrictions on agricultural
products to support their agricultural price stabilization program entitled The Common
Agricultural Plan, the goals of which are to 1) increase agricultural production, 2)
maintain a fair standard of living for the rural population, 3) stabilize agricultural mar-
kets, 4) assure regular supplies of agricultural products, 5) maintain reasonable con-
sumer prices. This program is a serious barrier to United States agricultural exports,
as indicated by the United States' declining share of the Common Market's agricultural
markets, which fell from 14% in 1961 to 11% in 1970. 5 TRADE COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 62, at 13-19.
201. Trade Act of 1974, § 402, 19 U.S.C. § 2432 (Supp. IV 1974). This section
is the famous Jackson Amendment which led to the Soviet Union rejecting the United
States' offer to extend to it Most Favored Nation trade treatment.
202. Trade Act of 1974, § 403, 19 U.S.C. § 2434 (Supp. IV 1974).
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and manufacturing processes to enter their domestic markets.20  Be-
cause of the differences among nations in customs, standards, social and
economic needs, climates, geography, and attitudes, there is a lack of
coordination in formulating product standards, conducting tests and
inspections, and establishing certification systems. 204 This subjects inter-
nationally traded goods to such trade distortions as unnecessarily repeti-
tious tests and inspections, reduced levels of product and part inter-
changeability, and outright exclusion from some markets.20 5
Certain noneconomic objectives are recognized as valid reasons
for a nation to use NTB's and, accordingly, nations are exempted from
their GATT obligations with respect to implementing measures to ac-
complish them. These miscellaneous objectives include protecting the
public morals and protecting national treasures of artistic, historic, or
archaeological value.20 6
RECOMMENDATIONS
As previously illustrated, nations often have sound historical, so-
cial, economic, environmental, and political justifications for using
NTB's, many of which have been recognized in GATT. For this rea-
son, countries tend to feel that any attack upon their use of NTB's is
an attack upon their exercise of sovereignty.207 Moreover, with the
possible exception of quantitative restrictions, the effects of NTB's on
trade cannot be precisely measured.20 8 Therefore, countries are hes-
itant to enter into NTB reduction agreements because they cannot be
sure of receiving reciprocal trade advantages.20 9 Given these condi-
tions, the current GATT multilateral trade negotiations will not pro-
duce effective trade rules for reducing the use of NTB's unless the
negotiators adopt a motivational analysis approach and thoroughly exam-
ine each proposal to see that it adequately considers the purposes
served by NTB's, the availability of equally effective alternative meas-
ures for serving those purposes, and the diversity of social, economic,
203. See 4 TRADE C OMISSION REPORT, supra note 13, at 62.
204. Id. at 63.
205. See Groetzinger, The New GATT Code and International Harmonization of
Product Standards, 8 Cornell Int'l LJ. 168, 173 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Product
Standards]; Malmgren & Marks Negotiating, supra note 11, at 394.
206. GATr, art. XX, paras. (a), (f).
207. See Malmgren & Marks Negotiating, supra note 11, at 327-29.
208. See GOLT GuIDE, supra note 5, at 35; MALMGREN PEACEKEEPING, supra note




Allison: The Nontariff Trade Barrier Challenge: Development and Distortion
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2013
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
and political circumstances which exists among nations. The general
rules for implementing this approach are (1) the use of NTB's for
purely political or protectionist reasons should not be tolerated, (2) the
use of NTB's for valid development purposes should be encouraged,
(3) the use of NTB's to achieve noneconomic objectives should be har-
monized, and (4) whenever the use of trade barriers is appropriate,
the barrier which least distorts trade should be chosen.
Eliminating Protectionism
The first step toward eliminating protectionism must be to estab-
lish mechanisms for collecting and dispersing accurate information to
the public concerning the costs of protectionism, alternative methods
for dealing with inflation and balance of payments disequilibriums, sup-
plies of and the need for commercially essential materials, reasons why
differences exist in prices and quality of internationally traded goods,
and employment and job training opportunities. Widespread distribu-
tion of this information will strengthen the political position of trade-
biased forces by enabling the public to intelligently assess the relative
merits of trade distortive methods and alternative methods of achieving
national objectives.21 0 In an era of diminishing natural resources, it
is particularly important that the public understand and accept the con-
servation measures necessary to prevent shortages of commercially im-
portant materials from escalating into global economic or military con-
flicts. 21" ' Accurate knowledge of the differences in prices and quality
among internationally traded goods will facilitate early detection of im-
pending shifts in international trade patterns, so that adjustment plans
can be implemented in time to forestall drastic economic displace-
ments.21 2 A thorough understanding of price differentials is essential
to the formulation of adjustment plans which are consistent with the
210. See Walter Trade Policy Systems, supra note 104, at 23-35.
211. See Hesburgh Introduction, supra note 12, at 2, 3, 13.
212. Since the less-developed countries' comparative advantages lie in the area of
labor-intensive industries, their ability to sustain economic growth depends upon the will-
ingness of the developed countries to open their domestic markets to imports from low
wage sources. However, the developed countries cannot open their markets to low-wage
imports unless they have correctly anticipated the number of workers which will be
displaced and have made the technological innovations necessary to create the needed
amount of new jobs within their capital and technology-intensive industries. See SEcRE-
TARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT,
TowARDS A GLOBAL STRATEGY OF DEVELOPMENT, 56-57 (1968); UNITED NATIONS COM-
MITrEE FOR DEVELOPMENT PLANNING, TowARDs ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT-PRO-
POSALS FOR THE UNITED NATIONS' SEcoND DEVELOPMENT DECADE 24 (1970).
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long-range international comparative advantage configuration.21 3 Fi-
nally, employment and job training information will increase the job
mobility of workers who are displaced by changing patterns of interna-
tional trade. Increased job mobility not only will ease the fears and
discomforts of displaced workers, but also will insure that the most effi-
cient sectors of the economy have work forces of optimum size.21 4
The International Monetary Fund (JMF) is in the process of com-
pleting a major reform of the world's international monetary system.
This reform is directly concerned with preventing fundamental balance
of payments disequilibriums. To this end, the new monetary system
being devised provides for an increase in each country's reserve asset
holdings, more emergency funding to aid countries with serious balance
of payments problems, and greater exchange rate flexibility.215 In
view of the IMF reforms, GATT should recognize the primary jurisdic-
tion of the IMF over balance of payments problems by eliminating the
Article XII balance of payments exception to its ban on the use of
quantitative restrictions. At a minimum, Article XII should be revised
to permit trade restrictions to be imposed for balance of payments rea-
sons only when the corrective procedures of the IMF prove to be inade-
quate, and to establish the import surcharge as the only permissible
trade-restricting balance of payments remedy. 1 " However, GATT's
Article XVIII balance of payments preference for less-developed coun-
tries should be retained. Because of their dependency upon the sales
213. See MALMGREN PEACEKEEPING, supra note 11, at 158-60; MALMGREN TRADE,
supra note 27, at 52.
214. For example, a Brookings Institute study discovered that by protecting its weak
domestic textile industry the United States contributed to the labor shortage within its
apparel industry which has export potential. WORLD TRADE ADJusTMNENT, supra note
103, at 8; See generally Bale Adjustment, supra note 103, at 166.
215. The IMF's Interim Committee on Monetary Reform reached an understanding
known as the Jamaica Accord on January 8, 1976, which when fully implemented will
legalize floating exchange rates and increase the total resources available to developing
countries with balance of payments difficulties by $3 billion. See 5 IMF SURvEY 17-
20, 30 (1976).
216. This change would not be drastic since the IMF already exerts considerable
control over the exercise of GATT's balance of payments exception under article XII.
See discussion in note 92 supra. The Trade Act of 1974 authorizes the President to
seek a revision of GATT's balance of payments provisions to "recognize import sur-
charges as the preferred means by which industrial countries may handle balance-of-
payments deficits insofar as import restraint measures are required." Trade Act of 1974,
§ 121(a)(6), 19 U.S.C. § 2131(a)(6) (Supp. IV 1974). Furthermore, the Trade Act
of 1974 does not permit the use of quantitative restrictions for balance of payments
purposes unless a fundamental imbalance has occurred which cannot be dealt with effec-
tively by an import surcharge. Trade Act of 1974, § 122(a), 19 U.S.C. § 2132(a)
(Supp. IV 1974). See Pnnu. BLOCS, supra note 7, at 157-58.
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of primary products for foreign exchange, less-developed countries
often experience sudden and violent shifts in their balance of payments
positions which can be corrected through the IMF's exchange rate flex-
ibility mechanism only by drastic changes in their exchange rates.
Drastic exchange rate changes produce shifts of undesirable magni-
tudes in a country's domestic income distribution patterns, and are
therefore politically unpopular. 217  Requiring the less-developed coun-
tries to exhaust their IMF credits before resorting to trade restrictions
for balance of payments purposes is counter-productive to development
programs. Such a requirement makes it nearly impossible for the less-
developed countries to maintain the foreign exchange they need for im-
porting the capital goods essential to their development programs, but
not produced economically at home.218
GATT's rules pertaining to materials in short supply are inade-
quate to meet the economic problems arising from the developing
shortages of commercially essential materials. With the exception of
the requirement in Article XX, paragraph j, that short supply measures
should be adopted which are consistent with assuring each nation an
equitable supply of essential resources, these rules do little more than
recognize that, in some instances, a nation may be justified in using
NTB's in order to conserve its supply of essential resources.
Devising an equitable resource distribution system is such a com-
plex undertaking that it is beyond the scope of the present GATT mul-
tilateral negotiations. The present system, using the price function of
the law of supply and demand, may have to be replaced by an inter-
national planning and rationing system as the mechanism for determin-
ing how much of a given resource is to be produced each year and how
that annual production is to be distributed. The rationing system
would prevent both the early exhaustion of the world's supply of essen-
tial resources, and the creation of resource distribution patterns which
are skewed unduly in favor of the wealthy nations.2 19 Clearly, to be
217. See VEnrr TRADE AGREEmENTS, supra note 31, at 83; Erb Systems, supra note
88, at 31-32.
218. In fact, the less-developed countries' balance of payments problems are severe
enough for it to be suggested that less-developed countries should protect their industries
on a basis of how much foreign exchange could be saved through import substitution,
rather than whether the protected industry could become self-sufficient. S. LINDER,
TRADE POLICY FOR DEvELoPmENT 93 (1967).
219. If price is to be the sole determinant of how much resources shall be produced
and how such production shall be distributed, the wealthy nations will be able to con-
tinue their high rates of resource consumption patterns regardless of the facts that re-
serves of some resources are approaching exhaustion and that less-developed countries
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equitable, the new distribution schemes must be designed to avoid mas-
sive dislocations of the developed countries' economies without doom-
ing the less-developed countries to perpetual poverty through rigid ad-
herence to historical distribution patterns. The price of this interna-
tional scheme will be a decrease of efficiency in the world's overall
production configuration 220 and a loss by all nations of a portion of their
sovereign control over their domestic economies. 221 As a consequence,
the measures that must be taken to fully implement an equitable re-
source distribution system are too great a departure from the free trade
principles that form the basis of GATT to be assimilated during the
current trade negotiations.
It is possible, however, for the current GATT multilateral trade
negotiations to produce rules and principles which encourage the con-
tracting parties to reduce their demands for essential resources through
resource conservation programs, and to begin collecting the data which
will be vital to rational planning. Each contracting party should be
required to report annually to the Contracting Parties the amount of
essential resources it produces and consumes, its source of essential re-
sources, to whom and in what amounts it supplies essential resources,
the reserves of essential resources it possesses, and the purposes for
which it consumes essential resources. This data must be collected,
otherwise it will be impossible to construct an equitable resource dis-
tribution system. No country should be allowed to use NTB's to
restrict international trade of scarce resources unless it has imple-
mented a resource conservation program approved by the Contracting
Parties. Producing nations which unduly restrict the flow of scarce re-
sources should be subject to complaint procedures entitling those ag-
grieved consuming nations which have implemented approved con-
servation programs to apply restrictions to the imports and exports of
the offenders. Hopefully, resource conservation programs will reduce
demands for scarce essential resources to the point that international
will not be able to secure the supplies of raw materials they need for development.
See North-South Dialogue, supra note 24, at 555-59; Hesburgh Introduction, supra note
12, at 2-3.
220. This is because enough scarce resources must be set aside for the inefficient
infant industries of less-developed nations if the less-developed world is to be given the
opportunity to grow economically.
221. The loss of national sovereignty to a supranational resource distribution agency
would represent a formal expression of the fact that all nations are becoming economi-
cally interdependent, which reduces the degree to which each nation can unilaterally act
in its own economic interest without affecting other nations and possibly triggering a
trade war as a result. See PREG BLOCS, supra note 7, at 10, 24, 139, 146, 152.
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tensions arising from imminent resource shortages can be controlled
long enough to prevent economic warfare from erupting before an
equitable resource distribution system is devised and implemented.
GATT's antidumping and countervailing policies strike an appro-
priate balance between protecting domestic economies from the NTB's
of others, and providing the flexibility in pricing and subsidization prac-
tices that stimulate international price competition and allow less-devel-
oped nations to develop badly needed export industries. Two minor
changes should be made in GATT's countervailing policy which would
make it even more consistent with GATT's pro-competitive and pro-
development principles. The first change would be to modify Article
VI so that development subsidies which are merely compensatory, and
do not affect the international price of goods, are not subject to counter-
vailing. Although the injury standard of Article VI theoretically should
insulate compensatory development subsidies from countervailing, spe-
cific language to that effect would prevent liberal interpretations of the
injury standard from producing a contrary result.22 Secondly, an addi-
tion should be made to Article VI to insulate the subsidies that less-
developed countries employ, pursuant to Article XVIII's development
exceptions, from countervailing actions by developed countries.223  Be-
cause one less-developed country should not be allowed to gain at the
expense of another, the present Article VI countervailing rules should
apply when subsidized goods penetrate the markets of less-developed
countries.
Approval of the GATT antidumping and countervailing policies
leads to the disapproval of those antidumping and countervailing poli-
cies of the United States which are inconsistent with those of GATT.
The benefits of the United States' antidumping and countervailing pol-
icies to its domestic industries are outweighed by the harm inflicted
upon its consumers and upon its status as an advocate of free trade.
222. GAT's art. VI permits the countervailing only of those subsidies which mate-
rially injure a domestic industry. However, the material injury standard may leave room
for a country to countervail subsidies which were granted to a producer to compensate
it for disadvantages it incurred by cooperating in national development programs when
such a producer succeeds in capturing a large amount of export business which it could
not have captured without benefit of the subsidy. In recognition of this danger a rule
of reason should be adopted so that compensatory subsidies are not subject to counter-
vailing if their recipients would have been competitive without the subsidy and without
undertaking the burdens of cooperating in a national development program. See Maim-
gren & Marks Negotiating, supra note 11, at 356-57.
223. Since GATT's art. VI does not specifically prohibit a country from countervail-
ing a subsidy granted under the authority of GATIs art. XVIII, this change is required
to prevent countervailing under art. VI from frustrating GATT's development policies.
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In view of these circumstances, the United States should be prepared
to bring its antidumping and countervailing policies in line with those
of GATT during the current GATT trade negotiations. If the United
States is determined to use its antidumping policy as an antitrust device,
rather than as a device to protect free trade, it should at least be will-
ing to extend to alleged dumpers the "meeting competition" and "cost
justification" defenses of the Robinson-Patman Act.224 This modifica-
tion of the United States' antidumping policy would prevent the Anti-
dumping Act of 1921 from becoming an instrument for squelching le-
gitimate international price competition.
GATT must be modified to dispel the idea that domestic produc-
ers are entitled to a "fair share" of their countries' domestic markets.
To be effective, this modification must bring voluntary restraint agree-
ments within the scope of GATT's prohibition on the use of quantita-
tive restrictions and tighten up the market-disruption concept, so that
it cannot be invoked by domestic producers to guarantee their survival.
Only slight changes in GATT's Article XI are needed to bring vol-
untary restraint agreements under GATT's ban on the use of quantita-
tive restrictions. Article XI, paragraph one, should be expanded to
224. Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970), permits
price discriminations which arise due to "differences in the cost of manufacture, sale,
or delivery resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which such commodi-
ties are to such purchasers sold or delivered . .-. .", and section 2(b) permits sellers
to rebut a prima facie case against them by showing that their lower prices were made
in good faith to meet equally low prices of a competitor. The Robinson-Patman Act,
15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1970). As a practical matter, given the transportation expenses
associated with exporting, a cost justification defense would not be relied on too often
unless the exporter achieves great savings through large volume sales. On the other
hand, the meeting competition defense would allow exporters to engage in necessary
promotional pricing to enter markets which are more competitive or have greater price
elasticities than their home markets. Such a result would allow exporters to maximize
their revenues and utilize their full productive capacity while providing domestic con-
sumers with a greater range of produce choices at competitive prices. Perhaps the best
criteria to use would be to determine if the exporter's international prices are self-sup-
porting or are subsidized by the high prices prevailing in its home market. When the
exporter's prices are not self-supporting, the price discrimination should be con-
demned as predatory and antidumping duties assessed against the dumped products.
See Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967), reh. den., 387 U.S.
949, on remand, 396 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. den., 398 U.S. 860; Moore v.
Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954), reh. den., 348 U.S. 932 (1955). In the
absence of predation, the Trade Commission could determine if the exporter was the
price aggressor and if so assess dumping duties on its products if its low prices result in
the impairment of the profitability of domestic firms to such a degree that a significant
number of them will be weakened as competitive forces should the price discrimination
continue. See Dean Milk Co. v. FTC, 395 F.2d 696, 711-14 (7th Cir. 1968) (holding
that the record failed to disclose substantial evidence that Dean Milk Co.'s price dis-
crimination caused the diversion of business and loss of profits of its competitors).
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outlaw any activity on the part of a contracting party which directly
or indirectly aids its domestic producers or forces foreign producers
to enter into voluntary restraint agreements. The list of prohibited ac-
tivities should include (1) extending governmental diplomatic and ne-
gotiation services to producers wishing to negotiate voluntary restraint
agreements, 225 (2) blackmailing foreign producers into reducing their
imports to domestic markets of other nations, without utilizing GATT's
multilateral consultative procedures, by threatening to impose quantita-
tive restrictions on their products,22 6 and (3) establishing customs pro-
cedures which enable participating producers to enforce or comply with
the voluntary restraint agreements they have joined.227 A more funda-
mental change would be to impose on all contracting parties an affirma-
tive obligation to treat voluntary restraint agreements as illegal re-
straints of trade and take appropriate actions against those domestic
producers which impose, or conspire to impose, such illegal restraints
on international trade.228
225. Voluntary Restraint Agreements were negotiated with steel producers of Japan,
Great Britain and Western Europe affecting 85 percent of the United States' steel im-
ports during the years 1968-74. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Rogers
352 F. Supp. 1319, 1321 (D.D.C. 1973), affirmed, Consumers Union of United States,
Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136, 139 (D.C. Cir. 1974); cert. den., 421 U.S. 1004 (1975).
These Voluntary Restraint Agreements were initiated by the United States Secretary
of State at the direction of President Nixon. The circuit court held that the executive
branch did not exceed its authority in participating in these negotiations because the
agreements were not enforceable and therefore not covered by the Trade Expansion
Act of 1962 by which Congress delegated to the President certain powers for negotiating
enforceable import restraints. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Kissinger,
506 F.2d 136, 142 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
226. In the case of the voluntary restraint agreements on steel imports the United
States used as leverage attempts by Congress to impose mandatory quotas on steel im-
ports in violation of GATT. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Kissinger,
506 F.2d 136, 138 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Similar legislative proposals plus an evenly di-
vided Trade Commission "escape clause" ruling, which gave the President the opportu-
nity to impose quotas, were used in 1971 as leverage to negotiate a voluntary restraint
agreement on shoe imports with Italy. Oman, The Clandestine Negotiation of Volun-
tary Restraints on Shoes from Italy: An Augury of Future Negotiations Under the
Trade Reform Act of 1973, 7 CORNELL INT' L.J. 6, 9-11 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Clandestine Negotiation].
227. To implement and enforce the Voluntary Restraint on shoes the Italian govern-
ment initiated a statistical visa program which required Italian producers to provide the
government with statistical data concerning their shoe imports to the United States be-
fore they could receive new visas allowing them to make subsequent shipments of shoes
to the United States. Clandestine Negotiation, supra note 226, at 11. Not surprisingly,
the level of shoe imports from Italy to the United States fell 3.2% in 1971 after the
initiation of the statistical visa program, and increased only 2.5% the following year.
Id. at 16.
228. In Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Rogers, 352 F. Supp. 1319
(D.D.C. 1973) the court stated as dicta that executive branch participation in negotiat-
ing Voluntary Restraint Agreements would not shield the participating steel companies
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Tightening up the market-disruption concept so that it facilitates
free trade, instead of creating more NTB's, is a most complex task.
Specifically, stricter guidelines must be devised to control when and
how trade restrictions are to be erected during periods of market dis-
ruption. Trade restrictions should not be used when adjustment assist-
ance programs can make a temporarily uncompetitive industry self-suf-
ficient within a reasonably brief period of time. Similarly, adjustment
assistance programs are preferable for preventing displaced workers
from suffering financial hardships by facilitating their re-employment
elsewhere and providing financial aid to compensate them, pending re-
employment. 22 9
Trade restrictions may be necessary in a secondary role to provide
an industry a respite from import competition so that it can take full
advantage of adjustment assistance in order to improve its competitive
position. For example, an industry may need a short period of time
within which to coordinate its production techniques with new capital
equipment purchased with adjustment assistance funds.230 During pe-
riods of economic recession, a nation's economy may be incapable of
absorbing import-displaced workers for a socially undesirable length of
time,2 3 ' making adjustment assistance unduly expensive and ineffec-
tive. Trade restrictions would provide the displaced workers with pro-
ductive employment until improvements in the economy reduce their
unemployment periods to acceptable lengths.2"2
When the objective is to protect potentially displaced workers,
trade restrictions should be used only until adjustment assistance ade-
quately protects the affected workers, at which point the protected in-
from antitrust prosecutions. Id. at 1323. The Consumers Union had actually filed
an antitrust charge in this action, but inexplicably dropped it before the trial com-
menced. The Trade Act of 1974 contains an antitrust exemption for those who partici-
pated in the voluntary restraints on steel prior to January 3, 1975. Trade Act of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 606, 88 Stat. 2073.
229. See Free Trade Politics, supra note 103, at 152.
230. This justification for the use of trade restrictions is analogous to the infant in-
dustry justification, which recognizes that uncompetitive industries often experience a
lead-lag time between their creation or modernization and the point at which they be-
come competitive through the proper coordination of modem capital equipment, well-
trained managers and workers, adequate supplies of resources, and adequate support serv-
ices (i.e., transportation, legal, accounting, etc.). See Vminrr TRAE AGREEMENTs, su-
pra note 31, at 29.
231. See MALMGREN TRAm, supra note 27, at 30.
232. The concern here is to avoid producing disincentives to work among workers
by keeping them out of work and on adjustment assistance for a long period of time.
See Free Trade Politics, supra note 103, at 167. The maximum length of time adjust-
ment assistance is extended to workers under the Trade Act of 1974 is 78 weeks. Trade
Act of 1974, § 233(a), 19 U.S.C. § 2294 (Supp. IV 1974).
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dustry should be subjected to the full force of trade competition.238
When the objective is to restore a domestic industry to self-sufficiency,
until the protected industry begins to recover, the market shares of im-
ports should never be reduced below previous levels, 284 should be al-
lowed to grow as fast as the relevant market in an expanding market,
and should be allowed to grow at least five percent every twelve months
in a static or contracting market.23 5  The restrictions on trade should
be imposed only to the extent necessary for sufficient profits to be
earned by those engaged in the protected industry. 8 6  If the protected
industry does not show signs of recovery after five years, the trade re-
strictions should be removed altogether, or reduced to the level neces-
sary to protect the financial status of workers during the phase-out
period. 8 Putting these recommendations for handling market disrup-
tions into practice will relegate trade restrictions to measures of last
resort for dealing with market disruptions. More importantly, if fol-
lowed, these recommendations will prevent uncompetitive industries
from surviving longer than they should under the protection of so-called
orderly marketing agreements, like the Long-Term Arrangement 'Re-
garding International Trade in Cotton Textiles. 28 s
Pareto's theory of efficiency holds that a transaction is efficient
only if it allows some to gain without causing anyone to lose.2 0 Ad-
justment assistance is an attempt to put this theory into practice by
using public funds to compensate those who lose when domestic indus-
tries are displaced by imports, which provide consumers with lower
priced goods and services. Compensating the losers of free trade for
233. See MALMGREN TRADE, supra note 27, at 31.
234. See OECD PoLicY, supra note 80, 260, at 84.
235. The object of this recommendation is to insure that the foreign producers enjoy-
ing comparative advantages will be allowed to exploit their advantages to a reasonable
extent without defeating the purpose of the market-disruption program. This recommen-
dation is based on the growth provisions of the long-term Agreement Regarding Inter-
national Trade in Cotton Textiles. LT.A., supra note 121, annex B, para. 2, [1962]
3 U.S.T. 2681.
236. Under the Trade Act of 1974, one of the criteria used to determine if imports
are seriously injuring a domestic industry for purposes of granting import relief is "the
inability of a significant number of firms to operate at a reasonable level of
profit. . . ." Trade Act of 1974, § 201(b) (2) (A), 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b) (2) (A) (Supp.
IV 1974).
237. Under the Trade Act of 1974, import relief may be granted as necessary to
prevent serious injury to domestic industries for a period not to exceed 5 years. Trade
Act of 1974, § 203, 19 U.S.C. § 2253 (Supp. IV 1974).
238. See note 121 supra.
239. R. Domnn.AN, PxucEs AND MARKETs 174-75, 195, 223-24 (2d ed. 1972).
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their losses should reduce the political pressure to impose trade restric-
tions against imports.2 4 °
Unfortunately, the adjustment assistance process is not this simple.
The losers of free trade are so varied that it is impossible to compensate
all of them. These losers include workers and investors associated with
displaced domestic industries, the unions to which the displaced work-
ers belong, the communities to which the displaced industries are eco-
nomically important, and the firms to which the displaced industries
represent a substantial volume of business. 241 The present adjustment
assistance policy of the Trade Act of 1974 provides compensation -to
business firms seriously damaged by import competition,242 to workers
who are separated from their jobs as a result of import related damage
to their employers,2 48 and to communities which suffer economically
from high unemployment and busiless failures attributable in part to
import competition. 24
4
Since adjustment assistance cannot compensate all of the losers of
free trade, it is important that adjustment assistance benefits are care-
fully tailored to meet the problems they are to alleviate. If the benefits
are too generous, business firms may lose some of their incentive to
operate efficiently because they are insured against the normal attri-
tion associated with vigorous business competition,4 and workers may
have their incentive to work impaired because they can remain unem-
ployed for long periods of time without suffering financial damage. 246
On the other hand, it is essential that workers are completely reim-
bursed for the loss of salaries and the expenses of job training, job
searching, and relocating, and that they receive compensation for such
externalities as loss of seniority, loss of job satisfaction and security, and
the emotional upheaval of leaving communities in which family roots
have been established.247 Lesser benefits will not overcome worker
opposition to free trade, since labor unions as uncompensated losers
from free trade, maintain political pressure for the erection of trade
barriers. 2 8 Effective community aid programs can lessen some of the
problems of displaced workers by making it possible for import-dam-
240. MALNGREN TRADE, supra note 27, at 75.
241. See Walter Trade Policy Systems, supra note 104, at 26-28.
242. Trade Act of 1974, §§ 251-64, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2341-54 (Supp. IV 1974).
243. Trade Act of 1974, §§ 221-24, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2271-74 (Supp. IV 1974).
244. Trade Act of 1974, §§ 271-74, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2371-74 (Supp. IV 1974).
245. See Free Trade Politics, supra note 103, at 164-65.
246. Id. at 167.
247. See Walter Trade Policy Systems, supra note 104, at 23-25.
248. Id. at 27-28.
1976]
49
Allison: The Nontariff Trade Barrier Challenge: Development and Distortion
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2013
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
aged communities to attract new industries to replace those which suc-
cumbed to import competition, thereby providing displaced workers
with alternative job opportunities within their home communities.
The adjustment assistance provisions of the Trade Act of 1974 are
adequate with respect to business firms and trade impacted communi-
ties, but are inadequate with respect to displaced workers. Business
firms which have been seriously damaged by import competition may
receive technical and financial aid for the purpose of formulating and
implementing an economic adjustment plan. 249  In order to preserve
the incentives of the firms to operate efficiently, financial aid comes
only in the form of loans and loan guarantees, and will not be granted
if the petitioning company can acquire the needed funds through the
private capital market, its own resources, 2 0 or if there is no reasonable
expectation that the recipient will be able to repay the sums loaned.251
Recipient firms can use adjustment assistance loans only as working
capital or to acquire, construct, install, modernize, develop, convert, or
expand land, plant, buildings, equipment, facilities, or machinery in
furtherance of an economic adjustment plan. 2
Communities which have been damaged economically by import
competition may receive direct grants, loans, and loan guarantees to de-
velop and implement economic rejuvenation plans under the Act.2 58
The loan guarantees include loans made to private borrowers by private
lending institutions in connection with a community's economic reju-
venation program. 254  To insure that the recipient communities dili-
gently pursue their economic rejuvenation plans, the affected commu-
nities and the states in which they are located may have to enter into
agreements with the Secretary of Commerce binding them to pay up
to 50% of any liabilities arising from loan guarantees made pursuant
to the community adjustment assistance programs.255
The adjustment assistance programs for displaced workers are in-
adequate because they do not completely compensate displaced work-
ers for their salary losses, job search expenses, and relocation expenses,
249. Trade Act of 1974, §§ 252-53, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2342-43 (Supp. IV 1974).
250. Trade Act of 1974, §§ 252(b)(1) (A), 254(c), 255(a)(1), 19 U.S.C. §§ 2342,
2344, 2345 (Supp. IV 1974).
251. Trade Act of 1974, § 255(a)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 2345 (Supp. IV 1974).
252, Trade Act of 1974, § 254(b), 19 U.S.C. § 2344 (Supp. IV 1974).
253. Trade Act of 1974, §§ 272(b), (d), 273(a), (b), 19 U.S.C. §§ 2372, 2373
(Supp. IV 1974).
254. Trade Act of 1974, § 273(d), 19 U.S.C. § 2373 (Supp. IV 1974).
255. Trade Act of 1974, § 273(e), 19 U.S.C. § 2373 (Supp. IV 1974).
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and provide no compensation to these workers for the previously men-
tioned externalities. Even if he works at a lower-paying temporary job
to supplement his adjustment assistance benefits, a displaced worker
is allowed to receive a maximum of only 80% of his previous average
weekly wage or 130% of the average manufacturing wage, whichever
is less.21 6 This benefit package destroys worker incentive to seek tem-
porary employment during the adjustment period, since a worker can
receive the average weekly manufacturing wage or 70% of his previous
average weekly wage, whichever is lower, without working.25 7  There
is no sensible reason why this provision should not be changed to allow
a worker to receive 100% of his previous average weekly wage by
working to supplement his adjustment assistance benefits, particularly
in cases when the work includes on-the-job training for a future per-
manent job. Job search allowances are limited to 80% of the expenses
involved up to a maximum of five hundred dollars,258 while maximum
relocation allowances equal 80% of the expenses involved plus three
times the worker's average weekly wage or five hundred dollars
whichever is less.119 Given the safeguard measures attached to the job
search and relocation allowance provisions, 2 6 it is unjustifiable to deny
displaced workers complete compensation for their job search and relo-
cation expenses.
Inadequate benefits may reflect the feeling that, other than being
displaced from their jobs because of import competition, import-
displaced workers are in no different position than any other worker who
loses his job because his employer is suffering financially.261 This
being the case, it is not justifiable to discriminate heavily in favor of
the import-displaced worker over the rest of the unemployed.262
256. Trade Act of 1974, § 232(a), (e), 19 U.S.C. § 2292 (Supp. IV 1974).
257. Trade Act of 1974, § 232(a), 19 U.S.C. § 2292 (Supp. IV 1974).
258. Trade Act of 1974, § 237(a), 19 U.S.C. § 2297 (Supp. IV 1974).
259. Trade Act of 1974, § 238(d), 19 U.S.C. § 2298 (Supp. IV 1974).
260. These safeguards include the requirement that workers must seek jobs in their
own areas before searching elsewhere. Trade Act of 1974, §§ 237, 238, 19 U.S.C. §
2297-98 (Supp. IV 1974). Workers will not receive relocation expenses unless they
cannot reasonably be expected to secure suitable employment in the commuting areas
in which they reside and have obtained suitable employment or a bona fide offer of
such employment of long-term duration in the areas to which they wish to relocate.
Trade Act of 1974, § 238(b), 19 U.S.C. § 2298 (Supp. IV 1974).
261. Unemployment often is caused by factors unrelated to increased importation
such as changing labor requirements resulting from economic growth and technological
progress within the developed countries. See MLMREN TRADE, supra note 27, at 74.
262. However, the inadequate adjustment assistance benefits may also reflect the dif-
ficulty in measuring exactly the losses to be compensated, the desire to not promote
inefficiencies, and the normal reluctance of those who gain from free trade to part with
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Rather than providing a rationale for granting inadequate benefits to
import-displaced workers, however, these circumstances point to the
need for the -United States to develop a single comprehensive jobs pro-
gram which treats all workers equally and adequately by establishing
improved unemployment insurance benefits and job training programs
for all workers who become unemployed through no fault of their
own.2"' A comprehensive jobs program of this nature not only would
dramatically improve the mobility of this country's labor, but also would
reduce political pressures for erecting trade barriers by removing the
present emphasis on import competition as a reason for workers becom-
ing unemployed.
Encouraging Development
Economic development of the less-developed world would stimu-
late an increase in world trade and prosperity that would benefit all
nations, since rising incomes lead to increased spending on goods and
services other than the basic food, shelter and clothing requirements.
However, current economic conditions are not favorable to develop-
ment. Energy costs have risen rapidly in the wake of OPEC's oil em-
bargo, creating massive balance of payments disequilibriums among the
less-developed nations. 2 4  Many developed countries have resorted to
the market-disruption mechanism to erect trade barriers against the
most competitive of the less-developed countries' products.2 " The
generalized system of tariff preferences for less-developed countries,2 10
as implemented by most developed nations, operates within narrow
quantitative limits,2s7 is subject to the market-disruption mechanism,168
a portion of their gains in order to compensate the losers. See Walter Trade Policy
Systems, supra note 104, at 23-25.
263. Such a comprehensive jobs program would shift the emphasis from protecting
jobs on a sector-by-sector basis to providing overall job security within the general econ-
omy. See MALMGREN PEACEnEEPING, supra note 11, at 158-60.
264. See North-South Dialogue, supra note 24, at 547-50.
265. See WmNTRAur PREFERENCEs, supra note 32, at 123-24.
266. For a description of how the generalized system of tariff preferences is sup-
posed to work, see note 194 supra. The United States has adopted its own generalized
tariff preference system in the Trade Act of 1974, §§ 501-05, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-65
(Supp. IV 1974).
267. For example, under the United States' generalized system of preferences, a less-
developed country loses its preferred status with respect to a given article as soon as
it exports to the United States a quantity having an appraised value either (1) in excess
U.S. G.N.P. for Previous Year
of $25,000,000 ) or (2) equal to or exceeding 50% of
U.S. G.N.P. for 1974
the appraised value of the total imports of the article in the United States in any
calendar year. Trade Act of 1974, § 504(c), 19 U.S.C. § 2464 (Supp. IV 1974).
268. See note 265 supra. The United States Generalized System of preferences indi-
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and therefore does not produce significant benefits for the developing
world.2 69 Moreover, the benefits which are generated by the general-
ized system of tariff preferences are eroded by multilateral trade nego-
tiations which lead to a lowering of tariff barriers. 70  The economies
of those less-developed countries which rely heavily on sales of primary
producers for their foreign exchange continue to be buffeted by wild
price fluctuations because comprehensive commodities agreements
which would stabilize these prices have not been reached. 17 ' Finally,
for a multiplicity of reasons, the developed nations are failing to live
up to their commitments to devote 0.7% of their gross national prod-
ucts to direct transfers of financial resources to less-developed coun-
tries. 272
The developed countries should aid the less-developed countries
by eliminating protectionism. The products of the less-developed na-
tions are among the most import-sensitive products sold within the de-
veloped countries' domestic markets. This is especially true of labor-
intensive products. As a consequence, trade barriers which arise
through the market-disruption mechanisms, market-sharing agreements
such as the Long-Term Arrangement Regarding International Trade
in Cotton Textiles, and voluntary restraint agreements have a particu-
larly severe impact on the products in which the less-developed coun-
tries enjoy comparative advantages. If the less-developed countries
rectly safeguards import-sensitive industries from market distortion by not including
their products as articles eligible for preferred status. Articles which are ineligible in-
clude textile and apparel articles covered by textile agreements, watches, import-sensitive
electronic products, import-sensitive steel articles, certain footwear articles, import-sensi-
tive semimanufactured and manufactured glass products, any other article the President
deems to be export sensitive, or any article subject to escape clause proceedings. Trade
Act of 1974, § 503, 19 U.S.C. § 2463 (Supp. IV 1974).
269. In 1968 the United States imported $8.5 billion of products from the less-devel-
oped countries. The import duties collected on all the imports amounted to approxi-
mately $.5 billion. One author estimated that the increased earnings that accrue to
less-developed countries from a United States generalized preference system would not
exceed $1 billion, and that this result would be paralleled in Europe and Japan. This
is a relatively small figure when compared to the $45 billion the less-developed countries
expected to receive from world-wide exports. See MALMGREN TRADE, supra note 27,
at 75-76.
270. See note 195 supra.
271. See note 190 supra.
272. At the second UNCTAD conference in 1968, the developed countries agreed
to make direct transfers of financial resources to less-developed countries in an amount
equal to 1% of their individual G.N.P.'s. See Johnson Seventies Strategy, supra note
105, at 19. Despite the fact that this figure has been lowered to .7%, only Sweden
has lived up to this agreement by transferring .72% of its G.N.P. for aid to less-devel-
oped countries. The United States and Japan are twelfth on the list at .25%, and
Switzerland is last at .14%. TIME, June 28, 1976, at 10.
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were allowed to exploit fully their comparative advantages, the result
could be stable domestic export-oriented industries, which would gen-
erate steady streams of foreign exchange and the capital resources
needed for product diversification. Furthermore, more rational coun-
tervailing practices among the developed nations would prevent the de-
struction of the less-developed countries' development programs involv-
ing government subsidization. Allowing the less-developed countries
greater latitude in the use of subsidies is important, because it reduces
the need for these countries to use more trade-distortive measures in
developing infant industries.2 73
The less-developed countries' use of NTB's to develop their infant
industries should be encouraged when it is an integral part of carefully
drafted and coordinated development plans. Coordination among the
less-developed countries of development plans is essential, because
haphazard development programs spawn costly infant industries which
cannot survive without continual protection. 7 4  Counterproductive
trade competition is encouraged as each country seeks to establish the
same large scale industries in areas which can adequately support only
one or a few.2 75 More importantly, it is unreasonable to expect other
nations to tolerate the burdens of trade restrictions imposed on
their producers in the name of development without receiving some
assurance that the desired development will occur. Although GATT's
Article XVII calls for the Contracting Parties to annually review all
measures adopted by less-developed countries for the development of
their infant industries, this provision has not been complied with, be-
cause the less-developed countries resent having other parties overlook
their economic policies. 6  In view of the developed countries' poor
response to the needs of the less-developed countries, their resentment
of Article XVIII's oversight procedure is understandable. Neverthe-
less, for the foregoing reasons this resentment must be overcome. A
good beginning point would be for the developed countries to reduce
their protectionist measures against the products of the less-developed
countries, and to exhibit some evidence that they take seriously their
development obligations under part IV of GATT.27 7  This provision
is particularly important because it subjects the developed countries to
GATT complaint procedures, insuring that they effectively carry out
273. See Vmtnrr TRADE AGREEMENTS, supra note 31, at 180.
274. See MALMGREN TRADE, supra note 27, at 34.
275. Id. at 57-60.
276. See note 185 supra.
277. See note 187 supra.
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their development obligations.27 8 A demonstration that GATT proce-
dures apply equally to developed countries as well as the less-devel-
oped countries should weaken objections to GATT oversight of devel-
opment programs.
In connection with infant industry development, Article XVIII,
which gives a nation damaged by infant industry protection measures
the right to receive compensation from the protecting country, should
be modified to confer compensation rights only on less-developed coun-
tries .2 9  Developed countries should be able to bear the cost of such
protectionist measures, but a less-developed country should not be al-
lowed to gain at the expense of another. Precedent for this recom-
mendation is found in GATTs Article XXXVI, Paragraph 8:
The developed contracting parties do not expect recipro-
city for commitments made them in trade negotiations to
reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to the trade of less-
developed contracting parties.280
This GATT development principle was implemented in recognition of
the fact that less-developed countries have little to offer in the way of
bargaining concessions, so that to expect reciprocity from them would
deny them the benefits of multilateral trade negotiations. 21  The less-
developed countries also have little to offer as compensation to those
278. GATr, art. XXXVII, para. 2, provides that whenever a contracting party feels
the development commitments of Part IV are not being complied with, upon request
the Contracting Parties shall consult with the offending contracting party and all inter-
ested contracting parties to resolve the problem.
279. Specifically, GATT, art. XVIII, para. 22, gives contracting parties which are
detrimentally affected by development actions taken by a less-developed country, as
authorized by art. XVIII, the right to suspend unilaterally the application to the trade
of the offending less-developed country concessions or GATT obligations which are sub-
stantially equal to the damage suffered by their economies.
280. This provision already applies to actions taken by a less-developed country to
aid the development of a specific industry under Section A of article XVIII, which al-
lows a less-developed country to withdraw or modify a tariff concession it has agreed
to under GAT in the furtherance of development. GATT, Annex I, ad. art. XXXVI,
para. 8. To carry out this recommendation, GAIT, art. XXXVI, para. 8 should be
extended to actions taken by less-developed countries under Section C of article XVIII,
which allows less-developed countries to use governmental assistance inconsistent with
those authorized by GAT to aid in the development of specific industries.
281. See GATT, annex I, ad. art. XXXVI, para. 8; Wall Opportunities, supra note
35, at 42. This principle has been applied in the United States Trade Act of 1974
which contains a provision authorizing the President to evaluate all trade agreements
entered into under the authority of the Trade Act of 1974 and modify those which
have not provided the United States substantially equivalent competitive opportunities
as such agreements have provided other major industrialized countries. Trade Act of
1974, § 126, 19 U.S.C. § 2136 (Supp. IV 1974). The Trade Act of 1974 contains
no comparable provision which applies to trade between the United States and less-
developed countries.
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developed countries injured by infant industry development programs.
To require the less-developed countries to extend such compensation
would deny them the development rights of Article XVIII.
As tariff reductions diminish the value of tariff preferences to less-
developed countries, pressure should increase for the retention of trade
preferences by the use of NTB's.2 81 Using NTB's to maintain trade
preferences for the less-developed nations is undesirable because it de-
stroys the central development feature of the tariff preference systems.
In order for a less-developed country to take advantage of a tariff pref-
rence, its industries have to achieve a certain level of efficiency and
competitiveness. 288  NTB preference systems which operate through
the use of excluders would guarantee the industries of less-developed
countries an uncontested percentage of the developed countries' mar-
kets, thus removing the efficiency incentives competition engenders.
This problem might be avoided if the developed countries granted a
fixed level of subsidies to their citizens who purchased the products of
less-developed countries. Like the tariff preference system, this sub-
sidization would only benefit the industries of less-developed nations
which achieved a certain level of efficiency.
A better way to encourage development among less-developed
countries is to allow them to enter into preferential trading arrange-
ments among themselves. Such arrangements permit the less-devel-
oped countries to coordinate the establishment of large-scale indus-
tries, so that each country will not unilaterally create industries which
its own economy cannot support and which must compete with identi-
cal industries in surrounding countries. 84 Technically, these preferen-
tial trading arrangements violate GATI's nondiscriminatory most-
favored-nation policy.8 5 GATT permits departures from its nondiscrim-
inatory most-favored-nation policy only when contracting parties pro-
pose to escalate a preferential trading arrangement covering one product
sector into a full-fledged customs union or free-trade area covering sub-
stantially all product sectors. 2 6  At present, the only way for contract-
282. See note 195 supra.
283. See WENTRAUB PREFERENCES, supra note 32, at 73.
284. See MALMGREN TRADE, supra note 27, at 57-60.
285. GATr requires that if one contracting party wishes to extend an advantage
to another contracting party with respect to a given product, that advantage must be
extended immediately and unconditionally to all other contracting parties. GATr, art.
I, para. 1.
286. GATT, art. XXIV, paras. 5, 8. A customs union consists of two or more coun-
tries which eliminate trade barriers on substantially all trade between them, and main-
tain a common trade barrier scheme against all other countries. GATI, art. XXIV,
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ing parties to legally enter into preferential trading arrangements af-
fecting only one or a few product sectors is to apply to GATT for a
waiver of their nondiscriminatory most-favored-nation obligations287 or
to enter into side agreements under GATT auspices, such as the Long-
Term Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Cotton Tex-
tiles.2 88  This situation should be modified to recognize the need of
less-developed nations to enter into limited preferential trading ar-
rangements by adding a development exception to GATT's Article
XVIII, legalizing limited preferential trading arrangements entered
into by less-developed contracting parties in the interest of economic
development. 28 9  These limited preferential trading arrangements should
dismantle trade barriers in the less-developed countries and lead to
the formation of new customs unions and free-trade areas.
Finally, it is time that workable commodities agreements are cre-
ated to stabilize the prices of primary products. Without stabilization,
it will be impossible for many less-developed countries to formulate or-
derly development programs. The major issue now is whether com-
modities arrangements should merely stabilize prices around a long-
term average price, or should result in a transfer of resources from the
developed countries to the less-developed countries by supporting
prices above the market average.290 The best economic method for
achieving the desired transfer of resources is direct financial transfers;
but they are becoming politically unpopular within the developed coun-
tries.2 91 Therefore, transfers of financial resources may have to be dis-
para. 8(a). In contrast, a free-trade area consists of two or more countries which elimi-
nate trade barriers on substantially all trade between them, but each country maintains
its own trade barrier system against all non-participating countries. GATr, art. XXIV,
para. 8(b). The rationale behind allowing the formation of customs unions and free-
trade areas is that they will foster greater trade among their participants which will
augment economic growth so that exports of non-participating countries will increase
or remain unaffected. See WmAB PREFERENCES, supra note 32, at 8.
287. GAIT permits a contracting party to apply for a waiver of its GAIT obliga-
tions which is not otherwise provided for when the Contracting Parties feel such a
waiver is justified by exceptional circumstances by a two-thirds majority of those voting
which comprise more than half of the Contracting Parties. GATr, art. XXV, para.
5.
288. See MALMGEN TMRADv, supra note27, at,48; Panno BLOCS, supra note 7,'at
37.
289. This reform would not radically distort GAIT's free trade principles since econ-
omists now question whether customs unions and free-trade areas produce trade creation
or trade diversion and whether some preferential trade agreements might promote trade
creation. See DAm GAIT, supra note 26, at 283-90.
290. See PREEG BLOCS, supra note 7, at 166; North-South Dialogue, supra note 24,
at 555; N.Y. TIMEs, June 25, 1976, § A, at 6, col. 1.
291. Among the reasons why there is a lower priority in the United States for pro-
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guised in the form of commodities price support systems. Before such
support systems are created, it must be remembered that they transfer
financial resources from consuming nations to producing nations.
Less-developed nations consume as well as produce primary products,
and many developed countries also produce primary products, so that
the commodities arrangements, if not carefully drawn, may retard
rather than accelerate the development of many less-developed coun-
tries.
Harmonizing the Rest
Harmonization is a technique for reducing the trade-distortive pro-
pensities of government policies which have incidental impacts upon
trade. The guiding principle of this technique is the recognition that
social, political, and environmental objectives are often as important as
economic objectives in the promotion of overall social welfare, making
it not only impossible, but also undesirable, to eliminate all government
policies which produce trade distortions.29 2 Proceeding from the rec-
ognition that governments must pursue policies which are inconsistent
with free trade and economic efficiency, harmonization requires gov-
ernments to implement methods of achieving their non-economic ob-
jectives which least distort international trade.298  Harmonization also
requires that all trading nations seek to coordinate their domestic poli-
cies, so that one nation does not achieve its goals at the expense of
another,294 and so that producers of internationally-traded goods face
minimal inconsistencies in the customs, business, safety, and environ-
mental regulations with which they must comply in order to sell their
products in international markets.29 5
In some cases, harmonization must be achieved by the unilateral
actions of nations. For reasons of national security or in order to
achieve income redistribution goals, all nations have sought to insulate
viding direct financial aid to less-developed countries are the fact that much of previ-
ously granted aid was wasted by countries which were not prepared to make proper use
of capital, there is a reduced pressure to gain military bases and military allies through
economic bribery, many developed nations including the United States are suffering from
balance of payments problems, and there is an increased emphasis upon increasing do-
mestic expenditures to provide relief from domestic poverty. See Johnson Seventies
Strategy, supra note 105, at 11.
292. See Walter Trade Policy Systems, supra note 104, at 18-22.
293. See MALMGREN PEACEKEEPING, supra note 11, at 86; OECD POLICY, supra note
80, 185, at 62; Liesner Harmonization, supra note 65, at 97, 105, 110, 112.
294. See OECD Pouic,, supra note 80, 185-86, at 62.
295. See 4 TADE COMMSION REPoRT, supra note 13, at 62-63.
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uncompetitive sectors of their economies from import competition. 96
This protection not only forces domestic consumers and foreign produc-
ers to bear the cost of such noneconomic goals, but also conceals the
full cost of these programs from the electorate.2 9 7  A less-trade-dis-
tortive method of achieving defense and income distribution goals
through the private sector is to subsidize the relevant uncompetitive in-
dustries. Subsidization gives domestic consumers a greater range of
products at lower prices and makes it possible for citizens to obtain an
accurate estimate of the cost of their government's noneconomic objec-
tives.2" If the electorate feels such objectives are too expensive, it
can force the government to abandon or reduce the scale of the pro-
grams adopted to achieve these objectives. For example, a nation may
feel compelled to maintain a capability of producing minimal amounts
of security-sensitive products such as steel. It can do so with the least
trade distortion by producing these security-sensitive products through
government facilities and leaving the private consumers free to pur-
chase cheaper imported steel.
In other cases, harmonization can be accomplished only by multi-
lateral consultation and coordination among nations with respect to
their national policies. Each nation must recognize that to receive the
benefits of international trade it must give up a certain amount of eco-
nomic independence, since any action it takes which restricts interna-
tional trade harms its trading partners and subjects its trade to retalia-
tory measures.2 99 In recognition of this growing interdependence
among nations, when a nation takes actions which could restrict inter-
national trade it should analyze the probable trade effects of these ac-
tions and inform all nations whose trade will be detrimentally affected.
This kind of consultation not only will allow the trade-restricting nation
to determine to what extent its export trade will be subjected to retalia-
tion, but also the trade-affected nations can assess how much damage
will be done to their trade, so that rational adjustment plans can be
implemented, and the trade-restricting nation can avoid trade wars by
offering appropriate trade concessions. More importantly, interna-
tional cooperation among nations in pursuing their domestic goals can
prevent the need for trade restrictions to be imposed.800
296. See MALMGREN PEACEEKEPING, supra note 11, at 82.
297. Id. at 83-84.
298. See SAMuELSON, supra note 2, at 669.
299. See PREEG BLOCS, supra note 7, at 139, 146, 152-53; Malmgren & Marks Nego-
tiating, supra note 11, at 330.
300. An example of such preventive harmonization was furnished recently when the
twenty-four members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
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During the multilateral trade negotiations, harmonization could
produce fruitful results in the area of international product standards.
An international standards organization should be established to com-
pile on a product-by-product basis the variations in product standards
among nations and to resolve those variations into uniform standards
for each product sector by the consensus of the participating nations.80 1
The international standards organization should follow a similar proce-
dure to develop uniform testing and inspection standards. 2  Nations
should participate in the international standards organization through
national standards agencies charged with the responsibility of formulat-
ing the product, testing, and inspection standards their nations wish to
implement.8 0 3 Once the international standards organization adopts a
standard, the participating nations should attempt to adopt it as their
national standard through reference legislation.0 4 Importing nations
should agree to accept without further tests and inspections, the prod-
ucts of exporting nations which are certified as complying with the in-
ternational standards, unless their national standards are significantly
more stringent.808 The international standards organization should
(O.E.C.D., which is composed of Western Europe, North America, and developed Asia)
agreed to coordinate their collective economic recovery by gearing their individual eco-
nomic growth rates to a 5% mark, so that one country's inflationary practices will not
create inflation among all of the industrialized nations. N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1976,
at 49.
301. At the present, there exists an organization entitled The International Organi-
zation for Standardization which attempts to perform this function. See Product Stand-
ards, supra note 205, at 174-75.
302. Id.
303. The United States participates in the International Organization for Standardi-
zation through American National Standards Institute (A.N.S.I.), which unfortunately
receives neither government recognition nor government aid. Id. at 176.
304. A major problem with the reference legislation approach is that the federal gov-
ernments of many countries, including the United States, lack the power to commit
smaller governmental entities and their private sectors to the use and adoption of fed-
erally-promulgated standards. See 4 TRADE CoMMssION RIPoRT, supra note 13, at 66.
In the United States there is also a question as to whether such legislation would improp-
erly delegate legislative authority to a private organization. See Product Standards, su-
pra note 205, at 178. Additionally, there is a question as to whether such a procedure
would violate the due process standards of the opportunity to be heard, notice of the
proposed standard, fairly conducted hearings, support for a decision in a record of a
hearing, submission of findings and a tentative report, and an opportunity to appeal
from the decision and report. See Hearings on H.R. 7506 Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce and Finance of House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93rd
Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. 107, at 196 (1974). This hearing concerned the proposed Inter-
national Voluntary Standards Cooperation Act of 1973, H.R. 7506, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973), which had as its purpose to enact a formal arrangement between industry and
the federal government with respect to harmonizing product standards. To date, this
bill has not been enacted.
305. See Draft Code for Regulation of Pr'oduct Standards, § 5, GATr Doe. No.
Comm. Ind. W/108 (1973), para. 14 at 5.
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mediate any disputes which arise between exporting and importing na-
tions. Although these recommendations will not harmonize all prod-
ucts standards problems, they should reduce trade distortions, foster
technological innovation, increase the interchangeability of products,
decrease production and sales costs, increase the reliability and de-
pendability of products, and end the wasteful duplication of quality
control testing.0
CONCLUSION
A great percentage of the world's population and supplies of nat-
ural resources is located in less-developed countries where poverty
abounds. Paradoxically, it is the small minority of the world's popula-
tion which lives in developed countries, consumes most of the resources
produced each year, and owns most of the world's wealth. Since the
supplies of natural resources are depleting rapidly, the less-developed
countries are exerting greater control over their supplies of natural re-
sources in order to gain more remunerative prices today, and to insure
adequate supplies for future economic growth and development. At
the same time, within the developed countries the demand for natural
resources continues to rise as their citizens' pursuit of higher standards
of living continues unabated. Consequently, the prices of natural re-
sources are rising dramatically, the developed nations' access to natural
resources is declining relative to their future needs, and tensions are
developing which threaten world peace and welfare. To blunt this
threat, economic policies must be implemented immediately which
minimize waste and promote economic justice. NTB's create waste by
diverting productive resources from their most efficient uses. There-
fore, the NTB policy for the future must be that the use of NTB's is
prohibited unless it contributes significantly to economic development,
social welfare, or environmental safety.
NTB's which are implemented for politically expedient or protec-
tionist motives perform no useful function and should be eliminated.
Politically expedient NTB's are substitutes for non-distortive methods
of solving national problems, such as balance of payments deficits and
inflation. When used to solve these problems, NTB's merely transfer
them from one nation to another, rather than eradicating their underly-
ing causes. Protectionist NTB's also benefit the utilizing country at the
expense of others. These NTB's allow uncompetitive domestic indus-
306. See Product Standards, supra note 204, at 173.
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tries to survive which make inefficient use of productive resources and
take business from efficient foreign producers. Thus, the notion that
uncompetitive domestic industries are entitled to a "fair share" of their
nations' markets must be repudiated. To this end, voluntary export
restraint agreements must be outlawed, and market-disruption proce-
dures must be reformed so that they are truly temporary measures de-
signed to forestall sudden economic dislocations. However, this repu-
diation will not occur unless each nation educates its electorate as to
the benefits of liberalized trade, the costs of protectionism, and the ap-
propriate methods of solving national problems. It is natural for those
whose economic well-being is tied to uncompetitive industries to op-
pose their demise through liberalized trade. This opposition can be
lessened by the implementation of adjustment assistance programs to
compensate the losers of liberalized trade, train displaced workers for
jobs in competitive industries, and hasten the transfer of capital from
the inefficient to the efficient producers.
The economic problems of the less-developed nations cannot be
solved unless the developed nations make greater efforts to advance
economic development through trade. The developed nations must
cease protecting uncompetitive domestic industries such as textiles in
which the less-developed nations enjoy the comparative advantages.
This would permit the less-developed nations to expand their competi-
tive industries, thereby lowering unemployment and acquiring in-
creased revenues. Within the developed nations, consumers would
enjoy a wider range of product choices at lower prices, and productive
resources would be released for use by efficient industries. The devel-
oped nations should be tolerant when the less-developed nations use
NTB's in furtherance of their development programs. Specifically, the
developed nations should neither countervail the subsidies that less-
developed nations grant their industries, nor ask to be compensated for
trade damage resulting from the less-developed nations' use of NTB's
to protect infant industries. In many industries firms cannot be com-
petitive unless they attain significant economies of scale. These econo-
mies of scale cannot be achieved within the small markets of individual
less-developed nations. To provide the expanded markets needed for
such industries, the developed nations should allow the less-developed
nations to grant trade preferences among themselves on a sector-by-
sector basis when the formation of customs unions or free-trade areas
is politically unfeasible. Less-developed nations which rely heavily on
the sales of commodities for their foreign exchange cannot sustain their
[Vol. 12:1
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development efforts, because the prices of commodities fluctuate wildly
over short periods of time. These nations must be helped by multilat-
eral cooperation to stabilize the prices of commodities. A price stabil-
ization effort will involve the use of NTB's to the extent that interna-
tional commodities agreements are formed to stabilize prices through
supply controls. Obviously, these development measures impose eco-
nomic burdens on the developed nations. In the future these burdens
should produce benefits, since increased prosperity in less-developed
areas will provide the developed nations with increased investment op-
portunities and new markets for their industrial goods.
It must be recognized that NTB's are essential elements of most
nations' programs for achieving foreign policy objectives, national secu-
rity, regional economic development, and environmental goals. NTB's
which are used for such purposes cannot be eliminated because attacks
on their usage are regarded as attacks on national sovereignty. How-
ever, it is necessary for the trading nations to harmonize their efforts
to pursue national goals since those efforts often distort trade. Each
nation must select the least distortive methods for pursuing national
goals. Multilateral cooperation is also required. Environmental and
product safety standards must be made as uniform as possible. Product
testing and certification procedures should also be standardized. More
importantly, multilateral consultation must be employed to reduce the
frictions that result when nations take retaliatory measures because
their trade was damaged by another nation's pursuit of valid national
objectives. Consultation would permit each nation to assess in advance
the impact proposed national programs would have on trade, so that
it could forestall the retaliatory measures of other nations by negotiating
compensatory trade adjustments.
The NTB policy recommended for the future encompasses pro-
posals which are inconsistent with free market principles in their use
of international economic planning and trade restrictions. The western
nations with market economies cannot, in good conscience, object to
the recommended NTB policy because it departs from free market
principles. These nations often depart from free market principles to
redress internal problems caused by imbalances within their economies.
Observing this phenomenon, one writer issued this challenge to the de-
veloped nations:
In nearly all Western countries, farm prices are presently
stabilized and farmers subsidized in one way or another, often
through price parities, i.e., "indexation." Antitrust laws are
1976]
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enforced against unfair competition. Favorable treatment
is accorded to domestic business and workers. Giant corpora-
tions "affected with the public interest" are regulated. Why,
the Third World wonders is something good for the home-
grown goose not equally good for the foreign gander?30 7
307. North-South Dialogue, supra note 24, at 560.
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